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Internet of Things (IoT) extends the Internet to our everyday objects, which enables new 
kind of applications and services. These IoT applications face demanding technical 
challenges: the number of ‘things’ or objects can be very large, they can be very con-
strained devices, and may need to operate on challenging and dynamic environments. 
However, the architecture of today’s Internet is based on many legacy protocols and 
technology that were not originally designed to support features like mobility or the 
huge and growing number of objects the Internet consists of today. Similarly, many 
security features of today’s Internet are additional layers built to fill up flaws in the un-
derlying design. Fulfilling new technical requirements set by IoT applications requires 
efficient solutions designed for the IoT use from the ground up. Moreover, the imple-
mentation of this new IoT technology requires interoperability and integration with tra-
ditional Internet. Due to considerable technical challenges, the security is an often over-
looked aspect in the emerging new IoT technology. 
This thesis surveys general security requirements for the entire field of IoT applica-
tions. Out of the large amount of potential applications, this thesis focuses on two major 
IoT application fields: wireless sensor networks and vehicular ad-hoc networks. The 
thesis introduces example scenarios and presents major security challenges related to 
these areas. The common standards related to the areas are examined in the security 
perspective. The thesis also examines research work beyond the area of standardization 
in an attempt to find solutions to unanswered security challenges. The thesis aims to 
give an introduction to the security challenges in the IoT world and review the state of 
the security research through these two major IoT areas.  
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Asioiden Internet (engl. Internet of Things, IoT) mahdollistaa suuren määrän uusia so-
velluksia erilaisiin käyttötarkoituksiin. Näiden IoT-sovellusten on täytettävä tiukkoja 
teknisiä vaatimuksia, kuten toiminta erittäin resurssiniukoilla laitteilla tai toimintakyky 
haastavassa ja dynaamisessa verkkoympäristössä. Laitteiden määrä verkossa voi myös 
olla huomattavan suuri. Nykyisen Internetin rakenne perustuu kuitenkin moniin vanhoi-
hin protokolliin ja tekniikoihin, joita ei alun perin suunniteltu tukemaan objektien liik-
kuvuutta eikä niiden miljardeihin nousevaa lukumäärää. Myös monet nykyisessä Inter-
netissä käytettävät tietoturvaratkaisut ovat lisäkerroksia, jotka on rakennettu paikkaa-
maan löytyneitä tietoturva-aukkoja. IoT-sovellusten teknisten vaatimusten täyttäminen 
vaatii tehokkaita erityisesti IoT-käyttöön suunniteltuja ratkaisuja. Niiden käyttöönotto 
vaatii kuitenkin yhteensopivuutta vanhan Internet-tekniikan kanssa. Huomattavien tek-
nisten haasteiden vuoksi tietoturva on usein jätetty vähemmälle huomiolle IoT-tekniikan 
suunnittelussa. Tämä työ keskittyy tähän vähemmän tutkittuun aihealueeseen. 
Työssä määritellään yleiset tietoturvavaatimukset koko IoT:n sovellusmahdollisuu-
det huomioiden. Sovellusten osalta työ on rajattu käsittelemään kahta suurta kokonai-
suutta: langattomia sensoriverkkoja ja älykkään tieliikenteen tietoliikenneverkkoja. Alu-
eilta mainitaan esimerkkejä käyttötapauksista ja määritellään niihin liittyvät suurimmat 
tietoturvahaasteet. Käyttötarkoitusalueisiin liittyvät yleisimmät standardit esitellään 
tietoturvan osalta. Määriteltyihin tietoturvahaasteisiin haetaan vastauksia myös standar-
doinnin ulkopuolisesta tutkimuksesta. Työn tarkoituksena on tarjota lukijalle valittujen 
sovellusalueiden kautta esittely IoT:n tietoturvahaasteiden maailmaan ja siihen liitty-
vään tutkimukseen. 
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LIST OF SYMBOLS AND ABBREVATIONS 
 
4G 4G is the common name of 4
th
 generation of cellular net-
work technology, including Mobile WiMAX and Long 
Term Evolution. 
6LowPAN IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks is 
standard developed by a working group in IETF that fin-
ished its work in 2012. 6LowPAN definition allows IPV6 
packets to be sent and received over IEEE 802.15.4 based 
networks. 
BER Bit error rate is the number of received bits of a data stream, 
that has been altered due to interference, noise, distortion or 
bit synchronization errors. 
C2C-CC The Car2Car Communication Consortium is a non-profit 
organisation initiated by six European car manufacturers 
(Audi, BMW, DaimlerChrysler, Fiat, Renault and Volks-
wagen) with aim to develop a open industrial standard for 
inter-vehicle communication to ensure interoperability, us-
ing IEEE 802.11 WLAN standards. 
CA Certificate Authority is the name for a trusted third party in 
PKI. 
CPU Central Processing Unit is hardware to carry out the instruc-
tions of a computer program by performing the basic arith-
metical, logical, and input/output operations of the system. 
CSMA Carrier sense multiple access is a MAC method in which a 
node verifies absence of other traffic before transmitting on 
a shared medium. 
CSMA/CA Carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance is a 
variation of CSMA, with the addition of collision avoidance 
mechanisms to better cope with hidden terminal problem. 
DDoS Distributed-denial-of-service attack is a variation of denial-
of-service attack, which originates from multiple locations. 
DNS Doman name system is a hierarchical distributed naming 
system designed for Internet. DNS is designed to resolve in-
formation associated to domain names. 
DoS Denial-of-service attack is an attack method, designed to 
compromise service’s availability to legitimate users. 
DSRC Dedicated short-range communications is a one- or two-way 
short- to medium-range wireless communication method 
specially designed for vehicular use. 
 vii 
ECC Elliptic curve cryptography is an approach to public-key 
cryptography based on the algebraic structure of elliptic 
curves over finite fields. 
FCC Federal Communications Commission is an independent 
agency of United States government. FCC regulates the use 
of non-federal radio spectrum. 
FFD Full-function device is a PAN coordinator node defined in 
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
GPS Global positioning system is a satellite positioning system 
developed by United States Department of Defence. 
GPSM GPS multicast routing is a GPS-based routing scheme, 
based on atoms and partitions. 
HART Highway Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol is an 
early implementation of Fieldbus, an industrial automation 
protocol. It is able to communicate over legacy instrumenta-
tion wiring, making it one of the most popular industrial 
communication protocols today. 
IEEE Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers is interna-
tional professional association dedicated to advancing tech-
nological innovation. 
IETF Internet Engineering Task Force is an organization that de-
velops and promotes Internet standards. IETF was formed 
in 1986. 
INSENS Intrusion-tolerant routing protocol for wireless sensor net-
works is a suggestion for secure wireless sensor network 
routing protocol introduced in article by J. Deng, R. Han 
and S. Mishra in 2003. 
IoT Internet of Things is a broad term used for to uniquely iden-
tifiable objects in an Internet-like structure 
IP Internet protocol is the principal communications protocol 
in the Internet protocol suite. 
LR-WPAN Low-rate wireless personal area network links devices to-
gether using wireless distribution method in a personal area 
with low transmission rate. For example, ZigBee networks 
are a LR-WPANs. 
MAC Medium access control is part of the data link layer in a 
seven-layer OSI model of computer networking. MAC pro-
vides channel access control mechanisms that allow several 
nodes to communicate using shared medium. 
OBU On-board unit is a communication device installed on vehi-
cles communicating in VANETs. 
 viii 
OFDM Orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing is a modulation 
scheme that involves encoding digital data ton multiple car-
rier frequencies. 
PAN Personal area network is a network for interconnecting de-
vices centered on an individual person’s workspace. 
PGP Pretty Good Privacy is a widely used data encryption and 
decryption method that uses combination of hashing, data 
compression, symmetric-key, and public-key cryptography. 
PHY Physical layer is the bottom layer in a seven-layer OSI 
model of computer networking. When using wireless me-
dium, PHY layer consists of transceivers, digital signal 
processor and communication algorithm processing. 
PKI Public Key Infrastructure is a key management method re-
lying on digital certificates issued by trusted third party. 
QoS Quality of Service refers to an ability to provide different 
priority levels between applications, users or data flows. 
RAM Random-Access Memory allows stored data to be accessed 
directly in any random order. 
RFD Reduced-function device is a basic PAN node defined in 
IEEE 802.15.4 standard. 
RFID Radio frequency identification is a wireless method of data 
transfer using electromagnetic fields. Passive RFID tags use 
inducted power from the reader device to transmit their 
data. 
RIPS Radio Interferometric Positioning System is a positioning 
method that relies on two external radio signals at different 
frequencies and calculation of phase offset between the sig-
nals. 
RSU Roadside unit is a static node placed on roadside in 
VANETs. 
SPINE Secure Positioning Method in Sensor Networks is a posi-
tioning method based on verifiable multilateration, devel-
oped for wireless sensor networks. 
VANET Vehicular ad hoc network is a mobile ad hoc network con-
sisting of moving vehicles as nodes. 
WAVE Wireless access in vehicular environments is a framework 
of standards consisting of IEEE 802.11p standard and IEEE 
1609 standard family. 
WirelessHART Wireless Highway Addressable Remote Transducer Proto-
col is an extension to HART specification, extending the 
protocol to communicate over wireless medium. 
 ix 
WLAN Wireless local area network links devices together using 
wireless distribution method in a local area.   
WSN Wireless sensor networks consist of autonomous sensor 
nodes distributed to monitor physical or environmental 
conditions, like temperature. 
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1 INTRODUCTION 
The term Internet of Things (IoT) can be shortly defined as uniquely identifiable objects 
in Internet-like structure [1]. The IoT extends the Internet and the Web into the physical 
world by means of smart objects. The objects or ‘things’ are Radio-Frequency Identifi-
cation (RFID) tags, sensors, actuators, embedded and wearable computers etc. The 
unique addressing scheme allows objects to be linked to over traditional Internet struc-
ture in order to cooperate towards a common goal. 
The IoT has been known as a term for almost 15 years [2], but still can be consid-
ered in many ways as a novel paradigm in present-day wireless telecommunications. 
The future IoT world allows linking of digital and physical entities by the means of ap-
propriate communication technology. IoT will have a big impact on everyday life of its 
users. Assisted living, health monitoring and enhanced learning are application fields 
that private users can directly benefit from. Corporations can use IoT to improve auto-
mation, logistics, manufacturing and business processes. The potential applications 
scale up even to a global level, like intelligent transportation systems. 
The introduction of IoT presents a new set of technical challenges. The modern het-
erogeneous objects are equipped with varying hardware capabilities and will greatly 
outnumber traditional computers. The communication, as well as the network itself will 
be more dynamic and despite differences, interoperability with traditional Internet has to 
be maintained. Progress has been made, but many technical challenges still need to be 
addressed before IoT can be widely accepted. 
The pressing technical issues have left security with a lesser attention among the IoT 
research and standardization work. Even though security should be considered as a part 
of the system design from the beginning, many pioneering IoT technologies, like many 
ad-hoc routing protocols, are fundamentally insecure by their design. However, the IoT 
security research has gained considerably more attention in the past 5 years [3] [4]. 
IoT consists of a huge field of technology with diverse security issues to cover. This 
field is limited to two major topics in this work. First one is wireless sensor networks 
(WSNs). WSNs can be used for varying applications, of which many are for industrial 
use. The standardization work has also advanced furthest on the industrial WSN appli-
cations and the amount of WSN implementations continues to grow. 
The second major area of this thesis is vehicular ad-hoc networks (VANETs). 
VANETs have been researched for a long time, but in many ways, it can be considered 
as an emerging field in comparison to WSNs. There are still many important security 
issues that have not yet progressed to the standardization phase. Still, it is possible that 
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VANETs will become world largest ad-hoc networks at some point in not too distant 
future [5]. 
The main objective of this thesis is to serve as an introduction to the current state of 
security research on the two selected major IoT fields. The attempt is not to try to find 
comprehensive answers to the presented security challenges, but to give the reader an 
opportunity to understand what has been done and what issues still remain to be ad-
dressed. 
The structure of this thesis is as follows: Chapter 2 defines some general security re-
quirements for all IoT technology. Chapter 3 presents major security challenges in 
WSNs. Chapter 4 introduces common WSN standards from the security perspective and 
research work beyond standardization is examined in an attempt to find answers to the 
remaining unanswered security challenges. Chapters 5 and 6 present security chal-
lenges, standards and research work for VANETs, similarly as Chapters 3 and 4 did for 
WSNs. Finally, conclusions are drawn in Chapter 7. 
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2 DEFINING INTERNET OF THINGS SECURITY 
REQUIREMENTS 
This Chapter sets a broad definition to security requirements for Internet of Things 
(IoT) technologies in comparison to today’s Internet. In the context of this thesis, to-
day’s Internet refers to traditional Internet structure, in which Internet Protocol (IP) is a 
global basis for connecting entities over mostly wired network infrastructure. This thesis 
covers two major fields in the IoT field, but the topics in this Chapter are discussed in 
the scope of the entire IoT concept. 
2.1 Security requirements and interest groups 
To start with IoT security requirements, some basic security principles are defined. The 
same general security requirements apply to the IoT world that we are familiar with on 
the today’s Internet. Security requirements consist of confidentiality, authenticity, integ-
rity, non-repudiation and availability. Following definitions are used in the context of 
this thesis. 
 
 Confidentiality: Information is disguised from unauthorized receivers. In 
other words, only the sender and intended receiver or receivers are able to 
understand the message. When communicating on a wireless pathway, 
eavesdropping and intercepting the message only requires eavesdropper to 
be within the transmission range of a transmitting node. For this reason, 
achieving confidentiality usually requires the use of encrypted messages. [6] 
 
 Authenticity: All parties involved in the communication should be able to 
confirm the identities of the other parties. In a face-to-face human communi-
cation this happens simply with the visual recognition, but in a digital world, 
other methods are required. Digital authentication might require signed cer-
tificates and a special network entities acting as a neutral third party for the 
authentication process. [6] 
 
 Integrity and non-repudiation: Communicated messages cannot be altered by 
unauthorized party. Successfully completed authentication process does not 
yet guarantee message integrity and non-repudiation. Data may be altered in 
the transit either by maliciously or by accident. Providing message integrity 
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and non-repudiation usually requires checksumming and other cryptographic 
methods. [6] 
 
 Availability: For a system to serve its purpose, information and resources 
must be available when needed. This is a key requirement for any communi-
cation to happen in a first place, but also easily compromised by denial-of-
service (DoS) attacks. The requirement of keeping attackers from gaining 
access to the infrastructure leads to the requirement of access control, which 
falls into the scope of availability requirement in the context of this thesis. 
[6] 
 
The future chapters of this thesis show that guaranteeing these requirements is a differ-
ent task in the IoT world. Providing confidentiality using public key cryptography might 
be considered well known and even trivial task in traditional Internet, but is considera-
bly harder in Internet of Things setting. 
The listed general security requirements are set by different interest groups associ-
ated with the use of the service. Different security requirements have different priorities 
among different interest groups on each particular use scenario. On a large part of use 
scenarios, the interest groups directly associated with the scenario can be divided into 
users and service providers. When future network architecture is designed, we need to 
take account the laws and restrictions set by the society. From a security standpoint, we 
need also to take an important fourth group into account, the attackers. In the context of 
this thesis, the interest groups are shortly defined as follows. 
 
 Users: Their interest is mainly in the utilization of services and the infra-
structure and properties associated with such use [7]. Depending on the us-
age scenario, they may be represented by the devices, software or people. 
 
 Service providers: They provide services and infrastructure. Their main in-
terest is to gain profit from the service and run profitable business enter-
prises. [7] 
 
 Society: Their interest is to protect society at large with the legal framework, 
which is enforced by government authorities. This group can also be ex-
tended to include standardization bodies, which advance people’s interest to 
have globally interoperable technologies and sustainable free market. [7] 
 
 Attackers: Their interest will vary, depending on the particular type of at-
tacker. Attackers act according to their own set of moral rules, which are 
usually at least partially in conflict with one or more of the former groups. 
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In addition to attackers, other interest groups can also have colliding interest with each 
other and the roles of the interest groups may overlap. Design goal of new network ar-
chitecture is an optimized compromise between users, service providers and society. 
2.2 Different attackers and attack types 
When new network architecture is designed, the ideal solution is to meet as many re-
quirements set by the users, service providers and society, but also at same time main-
tain a strong network security, thus keeping attackers from fulfilling their goals. For this 
reason, attackers are usually defined as some outsider group when describing the net-
work use scenario, even though not all the attackers are the same. Examining their mo-
tives, expertise, resources and willingness to take risks, allows us to better prioritise 
network’s security requirements. Hackers, lone criminals, malicious insiders, industrial 
spies, terrorists and national intelligence organisations are distinctly different attacker 
types. Following list of different attacker types is not comprehensive. 
 
 Hackers: Real hackers have considerable expertise, often greater than 
that of the system’s original designers. In terms of resources, they usu-
ally have a lot of time, but few financial resources. They are motivated 
by curiosity and desire to understand. Their willingness to take risks de-
pends on an individual. Some of them are risk averse and some engage 
illegal activities with no fear of prosecution and risk involved. [8] 
 
 Lone criminals: Lone criminals often lack expertise and resources. They 
don’t have money or access to the system. They are motivated by finan-
cial gain and thus target commercial systems. [8] 
 
 Malicious insiders: Malicious insiders are dangerous attackers. They may 
have considerable expertise and could have even been involved in the 
design of the system. They also have one ultimate resource. They have 
insider access to the system and are considered trusted. Most standard 
computer security measures, like firewalls are powerless against insiders, 
as they can simply bypass them. Malicious insiders are particularly prob-
lematic adversaries in IoT world as they require special security meas-
ures that can be hard to implement due to system limitations. [8] 
 
 Industrial spies: Industrial espionage attacks have precise motivations: to 
gain as advantage over the competition by stealing competitor’s trade se-
crets. Industrial spies have usually at least medium expertise and are well 
funded. A rational company will devote enough resources to gain accept-
able return of investment. These attackers have medium risk tolerance, as 
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they risk company’s reputation in order to gain considerable competitive 
advantage, both of which are considered valuable. [8] 
 
 Terrorists: A wide range of different ideological groups can be consid-
ered terrorists. Terrorists are usually more concerned with causing harm 
and gaining publicity than gathering information, so they tend to prefer 
denial-of-service -type of attack methods. Majority of terrorists have low 
expertise, and unless funded by a rich idealist, also low financial re-
sources. Terrorists generally consider themselves to be personally in a 
state of war, so they have a very high risk-tolerance. [8] 
 
 National intelligence organisations: A national intelligence organisation 
is extremely well funded, as it is considered a branch of military. This 
funding can buy a lot of equipment and expertise. A national intelligence 
organization is also a very risk averse. They don’t want their operations 
to get exposed and even the knowledge about them possessing certain in-
formation is considered valuable. [8] 
 
Internet of Things applications are often designed for specific purpose, which can help 
to rule out certain attacker types due the lack of their motivation to target the specific 
application. Like in traditional Internet, this can help backtracking the attacker in pub-
licly available networks, where the complete prevention of attacks is very hard due to 
adversary’s easy access to the network. The majority of all IoT technology can well be 
considered to be state of the art technology, which requires attackers to have consider-
able expertise and usually a specialized hardware to perform attacks. Moreover, indus-
trial application is a particular field in IoT technologies that has advanced well in to 
deployment stage already. These considerations hint that first attacks against deployed 
IoT technologies to gain publicity will most likely be performed by adversaries with 
considerable funding and expertise. 
To achieve their goals, attackers employ various attack techniques. Practicality of 
each technique depends on the network design and architecture, some being specially 
crafted for the specific network type. The following list is compiled from most of the 
commonly problematic attacks against Internet of Things technologies. 
 
 Eavesdropping attack: Attacker passively monitors the communication 
session between two parties using the network in an attempt to determine 
the contents of the messages [9]. IoT technologies use almost exclusively 
wireless medium at least in some parts of the network, therefore the only 
precondition is that the attacker is within transmission range of the com-
munication. Attacker may even use specialized equipment, like direc-
tional antennas to eavesdrop communication outside standard specified 
communication range. Eavesdropping can be passive or active. During 
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active eavesdropping, the attacker actively injects messages into the 
communication channel in order to assist him or her deciphering the con-
tents of the messages [9]. Many IoT applications are solely designed to 
transmit monitoring data over the network. This makes eavesdropping at-
tack particularly harmful, as performing it successfully might reveal ad-
versary all the necessary information with no need to further attack the 
network operation and risk detection. 
 
 Man-in-the-middle attack: Attacker positions himself or herself in be-
tween the two communicating parties. The purpose of the attack is to 
make both parties of the communication to believe they are communicat-
ing with each other, when in reality, they are communicating with the at-
tacker. Successful employment of man-in-the-middle attack allows at-
tacker to bypass cryptographic methods protecting the message confiden-
tiality and read the plain contents of the messages. Attacker can also 
modify the contents of the message, thus violating the integrity of the 
session [9]. 
 
 Wormhole attack: This is a variation of man-in-the-middle attack per-
formed in wireless networks. The attacker connects two remotely located 
compromised nodes with an external connection. The compromised node 
listens and tunnels packets with an external connection to the location of 
the other compromised node, which retransmits the messages. If per-
formed successfully, the other nodes in the network will misinterpret the 
location of the compromised node, which results in erroneous routing 
decisions by network’s routing protocol. [10] 
 
 Sybil attack: Sybil attack is another attack type performed against wire-
less networks and particularly harmful against many IoT applications. In 
this attack, the malicious node generates an arbitrary amount of fake 
identities, which it claims to be able to connect to. This attack aims to 
corrupt routing tables of neighbouring nodes or otherwise take advantage 
of network accepting multiple identities. Some IoT security solutions are 
based on majority voting and plausibility checks, which can effectively 
be manipulated by multiple malicious identities. [11] [12]  
 
 Denial-of-service attack: As the name suggests, a denial-of-service 
(DoS) attack is designed to compromise service’s availability to legiti-
mate users. This is done by flooding network nodes with extensive 
amount of messages. Effectiveness of different flood messages varies 
depending on the network design and the protocols used, but the main 
principle remains the same. The purpose of the flood messages is to 
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cause targeted node to instantiate data structures out of a limited pool of 
resources. Once the resources are exhausted, the node is unable to serve 
new legitimate connections, thus denying service’s availability. A TPC 
SYN packet flooding is a popular example of a denial of service attack 
on IP networks. Distributed-denial-service (DDoS) attack is a variation 
of denial-of-service attack. DDoS attack is performed simultaneously 
from multiple locations. [13] [14] 
 
 Denial-of-sleep: In the IoT world, a battery powered network nodes can 
also be attacked with a specially crafted denial-of-service attack designed 
to exhaust device’s power supply. This attack, usually referred as denial-
of-sleep attack, aims to send flood messages with certain frequency in an 
attempt to deny a network node entering an energy saving sleep state and 
eventually draining the node’s battery. [15] 
 
As seen from the listing, the basic attacks against wireless networks are very much vi-
able on the IoT world. The list of attack types can also be extended with specialized 
attacks against devices with limited power supply, which covers almost the whole range 
of IoT applications. There is also one considerable difference in the threat of various 
attacks in comparison to traditional Internet. Many of the more advanced attacks, like 
wormhole attack and Sybil attack require an attacker to posses at least one compromised 
node. This prerequisite is far more easily achieved with many IoT applications as the 
number of nodes is large and most of the nodes are unattended. This is discussed in 
more detail on future chapters of this thesis. 
2.3 Risk analysis and management 
Deriving basic security requirements in their relation to different interest groups is quite 
straightforward for the IoT world. The same basic principles apply as in the today’s 
Internet. However, future chapters of this thesis show that fulfilling these goals can be 
immensely harder in constrained IoT environments. Examining attacker types and at-
tack tools at their disposal shows that various constrains, battery powered nodes and 
challenging operation environments make IoT technologies more vulnerable. For se-
crecy reasons, there is hardly any public research available on military IoT technologies, 
but it is clear that IoT technology has various potential military uses, in which security 
is a concern not to be taken lightly. Other technical challenges have kept researchers 
busy and security issues have started to get more attention only in the recent years [3] 
[4]. The following picture taken from the reference [16] is an example of things that 
need to be considered in relation to IoT security. 
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Figure 1: From risks to objectives and control – example [16]. 
 
The picture gives an overview of various methods to protect the system from certain 
types of security threats. Challenging nature of IoT technology requires compromises in 
security, at least on many early IoT implementations. The risk management is not a well 
researched topic in IoT perspective, even though pioneer papers exist [17]. Some basic 
assumptions can still be made, like the most common motive for a network attack being 
a financial gain in one form or another. If there is no way to gain financial advantage 
from a certain type of attack, the probability of it happening is significantly smaller [8]. 
This thesis does not try to form a complete coverage of all the potential risks in the 
presented IoT scenarios, but to concentrate on the most probable threats and well re-
searched topics. The thesis presents security definitions of the most common standards 
in the selected IoT scenarios, as well as the most researched security challenges beyond 
standardization work.  The presented answers to these challenges are not comprehensive 
and most of them prioritize security on the threats that are assumed to be the most 
common on the particular application. 
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3 SECURITY CHALLENGES IN WIRELESS 
SENSOR NETWORKS 
The first major IoT area of this thesis is wireless sensor networks (WSNs). WSNs have 
a wide range of applications. These include ocean and wildlife monitoring, manufactur-
ing machinery, different kinds of performance monitoring, building safety, earthquake 
monitoring and various military applications. The range of applications is likely to 
broaden even more in the future, including pollution, wildfires, building security and all 
kinds of health monitoring. A common working principle for a wireless sensor network 
is that the large number of sensor nodes record data streams and direct them to a single 
or multiple aggregation points in the network. Wireless sensor networks introduce 
unique challenges to the network design which render traditional network security tech-
niques suboptimal or even useless. Sensor nodes are usually designed to be as inexpen-
sive as possible, which limits their computation, communication and energy capabili-
ties. They are often deployed in an accessible location, which makes physical tampering 
of the nodes a threat. A close interaction with physical world and people also presents 
new security problems, like an attacker purposely feeding the node with false data. [18]  
These are all aspects to consider when designing a WSN system. The next section 
presents some of the WSN application scenarios in more detail. Many of these networks 
are already at least on the real world testing phase. After example scenarios, Section 3.2 
lists general technical challenges and design goals that have to be met on WSN design.  
3.1 Example use scenarios 
Industrial automation can be improved by deploying IoT technologies and on some 
branches of industry, technology is already widely deployed. Applications range from 
storage management, production and quality control, assembly line machinery monitor-
ing and worker safety monitoring. Current industrial applications are mostly deployed in 
more static field of activities, like production lines in industrial plants but more dynamic 
work environments like construction sites have yet seen few applications. The range of 
applications is likely to get considerably wider in the future. 
The first example in a variety of industrial WSN applications is chemical plants and 
inventory management. Chemical inventories carry a tremendous value in a company’s 
supply chain. Traditionally, inventory management has been based on manual methods 
and dedicated hard-wired computing systems. Both methods offer limited ability to dis-
seminate accurate and timely information across widely distributed sensor points. Spe-
cific safety requirements for bulk storage tanks and tank farms can also make wiring 
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prohibitive and manual monitoring a hazardous task. Tank management system based 
on WSN can benefit supply chain by providing instant access to real-time inventory 
data for both producers and their suppliers, allowing them to manage and schedule re-
plenishment of inventory stocks to ensure a constant supply of raw materials. This ap-
plication is designed to integrate with the process logic controller, so that data from the 
additional sensors can be overlayed to input from existing fixed installation. [19] 
Another industrial WSN application is pulp and paper mills. WSNs can be used to 
monitor machines for diagnostic and preventive maintenance purposes. The rolling ma-
chines at pulp and paper mills are massive and have complex mechanisms. The smallest 
variations in temperature, speed or the alignment of the rollers can have serious effects 
on quality of the operation. WSNs are ideal solution for investigating and resolving cir-
cumstances such as unanticipated variations in output quality, unusual vibration, noise, 
or other signs of potential problems. Whether the need is to measure temperature, speed, 
pressure or vibration, technicians can attach the required sensor nodes to appropriate 
areas of the machine process line and the sensor nodes will connect by themselves. 
Equipped with smart I/O system to identify the sensor types, the nodes identify the data 
to be measured and relay it wirelessly to a handheld base station device. These ad-hoc 
or overlay systems can be quickly installed and rapidly removed once problems are 
identified and resolved. [19] 
Industrial WSNs can also be used in oil refineries. Heat tracing solutions have been 
delivered to continuous process manufacturers in oil refineries in extreme locations. To 
keep pipes and systems operating efficiently, heat tracing is used to keep pipes from 
freezing or within a particular temperature range. Traditionally, these systems have used 
wired connectivity for temperature sensing and heat trace control. As the number of 
temperature monitoring points can run into thousands, wiring costs can become prohibi-
tively expensive. Errors in wiring installation can result in a plant shutdown, where 
costs become extreme. Outfitted with WSN modules, and embedded networking soft-
ware, the temperature sensors can be more densely distributed with a reduced installa-
tion cost. Sensor networking allows a flexible deployment and the network adapts to the 
structure of the installation. The network allows peer-to-peer communication, and can 
help identify malfunctioning sensors before they lead to system failure.[19] 
In addition to industrial applications, WSNs are well suited for environmental moni-
toring. The environmental monitoring applications can monitor jungle wildlife in their 
native habitats, where human presence has to be minimized. WSNs can also be used to 
monitor vibrations on the edge of a volcano to provide early warning from any seismic 
activity. Commonly, WSNs can monitor areas which are hard to access, dangerous for 
humans, or human presence is dangerous for the environment. These networks can be 
deployed from aerial vehicle, or even ballistically scattered over deployment area [20]. 
Governments are also very interested in military applications for WSNs. Usually 
these applications involve detecting, tracking and intelligence gathering on enemy 
troops. There is even an example of ad-hoc based WSN network to locate enemy snip-
ers based on trajectory and speed of the fired bullet [21]. Military applications share 
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many similarities with environmental monitoring applications due to hostile area they 
are usually deployed to. Similarly, the deployment method is usually random scattering 
and the number of nodes is large. However, the security has significantly higher priority 
on military applications. 
There are also many WSN applications in which the locations of sensor nodes are 
not static. These applications include: tracking nodes planted on animals, advanced 
military intelligence applications, ocean monitoring with nodes that flow along with 
oceanic currents or even nodes planted in human circulatory system. There is well over 
10 years of research available on the nodes so tiny, that they can travel with the wind 
[22]. Nodes on these systems are usually very limited in their ability to actively com-
municate over radio transmission, leading to very specialized communication systems. 
For this reason, these types of WSNs have been excluded from this thesis. Node mobil-
ity also presents unique challenges to routing algorithms and allows new ways for ad-
versaries to perform attacks. These subjects are discussed in more detail in chapters re-
lated to VANETs. 
3.2 Technical requirements and design goals 
WSNs in general share a set of technical challenges and restrictions. Examining these 
challenges helps to outline the technical nature of WSNs. Most restrictions also affect 
the implementation of WSN security mechanisms. The major technical challenges for 
WSNs are outlined below. 
Firstly, WSN nodes are constrained in many ways. The design of many WSNs aims 
on having physically very small nodes with the cost of the individual node being very 
low. The nodes also have to almost always rely on a small battery or a limited amount 
of energy gathered from the operating environment. All this limits the nodes in three 
ways: Energy, memory and processing power are all very limited resources. Project 
Smart Dust is an example of very constrained nodes with the physical size of only few 
cubic millimetres [22]. [23] 
Many WSN applications also require nodes operating in harsh environmental condi-
tions. This also affects network connectivity. In industrial conditions, like on our exam-
ple scenarios, the topology and connectivity of the network may vary due to link and 
sensor-node failures. Furthermore, sensors may also be subject to RF interference, vi-
brations, dirt, dust, high humidity levels or even highly caustic or corrosive environ-
ments. The harsh conditions may hinder node performance, but the result can also be 
malfunctions, like some nodes reporting invalid or unreliable sensor readings [24]. [23] 
The varying WSN applications have different QoS requirement specifications. The 
definition of QoS in the context of WSNs differs from the traditional QoS definition. 
The QoS provided by WSNs refers to the accuracy between the data reported to the sink 
node and what is actually occurring in the environment. In addition, sensor data is typi-
cally time sensitive, like alarm notifications for the industrial facilities. If data has long 
latency due to processing or communication, it may lead to wrong decisions in the 
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monitoring system. In comparison to performance in wired networks, the attainable ca-
pacity of each wireless link depends of the interference level perceived at the receiver. 
Typically, high bit error rates (BER = 10
-2
 – 10-6) are expectable. Additionally, wireless 
links suffer from varying characteristics in both, time and space. This is due to noisy 
environment and obstructions. Therefore, capacity and delay attainable at each link are 
location dependent and vary constantly. All this makes QoS provisioning challenging. 
[23] 
However, there are a few advantages to QoS provisioning in WSN context as well. 
High density of sensor nodes in WSNs offers a good data redundancy in many situa-
tions. Sensor observations are highly correlated in the space domain. The nature of cer-
tain physical events also offers temporal correlation between each consecutive observa-
tion of the sensor node. [23] 
One fundamental importance of WSNs is to be commercially viable. This requires 
WSNs to provide services that allow the querying of the network to retrieve useful in-
formation from anywhere and anytime. This leads to the requirement of WSNs to be 
remotely accessible from the Internet and, hence the need to be integrated with the IP 
architecture. The current sensor network platforms use gateways for integration between 
WSNs and the Internet [25] [26]. The integration may change in the future, extending IP 
connectivity all the way to the sensor nodes. [23] [27] 
3.3 Authentication and key distribution 
After initial deployment and discovering direct neighbours, WSN nodes require some 
sort of authentication scheme as a basis for fulfilling authenticity security requirement. 
Authentication schemes require of nodes having the necessary cryptographic informa-
tion available. Secure distribution of this key information is a major security matter on 
WSN context. The unique nature of WSNs affects suitability of each particular authen-
tication scheme and key distribution method. 
The constrained nature of the nodes sets limits to possible authentication solutions. 
Limited memory resources dictate that individual nodes do not possess resources to es-
tablish unique keys with every other node in the network. Bandwidth and transmission 
power are also very limited. For example, the UC Berkeley Mica platform’s transmitter 
has a bandwidth of 10 Kbps, and a packet size of about 30 bytes [28]. Due to high bit 
error rates, the transmission reliability is often low, making the communication of large 
blocks of data particularly expensive. The resource limitations make most of the public 
key cryptosystems impractical for WSNs, such as Diffie-Hellman key agreement [29] 
and RSA signatures [30]. RSA operations are problematic due to limited amount of 
memory available on the nodes. Both cryptographic methods also suffer from the prob-
lem that using longer and stronger keys will increase the processing delay exponentially 
[31]. The long processing delay in performing public key authentication gives adversary 
an opportunity to perform DoS attacks against node authentication [32]. An adversary 
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can exhaust node’s energy source by sending arbitrary authentication requests, which 
will result in an exhaustive decryption and encryption of packets by the receiving node. 
The threat of a physical node capture also needs to be taken into account when de-
signing authentication solutions for WSNs. Many applications involve deploying nodes 
in public or hostile locations. Furthermore, the large number of nodes and the low-cost 
requirement makes it hard to manufacture tamper-resistant nodes or supervise physical 
access to the nodes effectively. If an attacker manages to capture a node, he or she also 
gains access to all the keys stored in node’s memory. [28] 
A particularly harmful attack against WSNs in is known as  the Sybil attack [11]. 
This attack is based on a node illegitimately claiming multiple identities. We refer these 
additional identities as Sybil nodes. The ease of physical capture makes this attack con-
siderably easier to perform against WSNs. The attack can be performed by fabricating 
new node identities, or stealing identities from existing nodes. If a node is identity is a 
certain integer value, an attacker can simply fabricate nodes by assigning them random 
integer values as Sybil node identities. If an authentication scheme with an intentionally 
limited name space is used, the attacker may need to assign Sybil nodes identities stolen 
from other legitimate nodes. This can go undetected when performed in conjunction 
with destroying or temporarily jamming the corresponding legitimate nodes. When ana-
lyzing each particular authentication scheme for WSNs, we will need to also examine its 
ability to resist Sybil attacks. [12] 
Resource testing is known defence mechanism against Sybil attacks [11]. It can be 
done as part of the authentication procedure, but also as a periodic security measure to 
maintain WSN authenticity. Resource testing is based on the assumption that each node 
is limited in some resource. Verifier is sent to ensure that each identity has as much of 
the tested resource as a physical device. Normally, the resources tested are computation 
power, storage capacity and communication ability. Testing the first two is not suitable 
for WSNs, as adversary may use physical device with several orders of magnitude more 
computation power and storage capacity than the standard sensor node in the network. 
The traditional method of testing communication ability is to broadcast request for iden-
tities and then accept replies within a given time interval. This method is also unsuitable 
for WSNs, because all the replies converging at the verifier will result in that part of the 
network becoming congested. We will later examine radio resource testing method that 
is better suited for WSNs. [12]  
After initial deployment of nodes and several weeks of operation, some nodes in the 
network may exhaust their power supply because of the uneven distribution of traffic 
load or malicious attacks. Some sensor nodes may be destroyed by hazardous environ-
mental events, like chemical leakage in a chemical plant or exposure to extreme heat in 
an oil refinery. Besides the natural loss of sensor nodes, some nodes may even be de-
stroyed by adversaries in an attempt to cripple communications in the entire WSN.  
Therefore, WSN authentication scheme must be able to accept authentication of new 
nodes that are added to the network after initial deployment. This implies that boot-
strapping information must always be present and cannot simply be erased after de-
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ployment to prevent compromise in the event of capture [28]. The possibility of the 
situation that all of the newly deployed nodes may not be legitimate also needs to be 
considered. An adversary may capture, re-program and then re-deploy compromised 
nodes back to the network or try to authenticate completely new malicious nodes to the 
WSN. [33]   
The role, density and capabilities of base stations also vary between different WSNs. 
WSN base stations are typically few and expensive. Relying on them as a source of trust 
invites attackers to target base stations and also limits the application of protocol secu-
rity. The communication patterns of sensor networks also differ from traditional net-
works. Nodes usually need to set up keys with their neighbours and with data aggrega-
tion points. Key establishment also needs to scale to the networks with hundreds or even 
thousands of nodes. Therefore, an authentication scheme that minimizes the communi-
cation with a base station working as arbiter or verifier is highly desirable. [28] 
3.4 Secure localization 
Most WSNs contain a large number of sensor nodes, hundreds to thousands or even 
more, which might be spread randomly over the deployment area. The method can be 
for example a random scattering from an airplane. This means that WSN protocols can-
not know beforehand which nodes will be within communication range of each other 
after deployment. Moreover, the lack of predetermined network infrastructure necessi-
tates the WSNs to establish connections and maintain network connectivity autono-
mously. [23] [28] 
The problem of determining the node’s geographical position and relative location 
within the WSN is referred to as localization. The term is similar to corresponding lo-
calization concept in VANETs. However, WSNs have radically different applications 
and a lot more constrained, but usually less mobile nodes. The nature of the problem 
and potential solutions are very different in comparison. The localization needs to be a 
part of the same initial bootstrapping procedure, where node discovers its neighbours, 
performs authentication, determines its location in the network, and establishes commu-
nication routes. 
Existing direct localization methods include GPS or manual location pre-
configuration. Equipping nodes with GPS receiver is simple solution to the problem. 
However, GPS-based system is not usable for indoor WSN applications and it is unreli-
able when sensors are deployed in an environment with obstructions such as dense foli-
age areas. Additionally, even though GPS-receivers are small in size, they cause consid-
erable battery drain and increase the cost of constrained sensor nodes [34]. Preconfigur-
ing node locations manually is also a possibility, but sets severe limitations to the 
WSNs. The node locations have to be completely static and random deployment meth-
ods cannot be used. This makes manual configuration method very cumbersome and 
expensive in terms of time consumption. Additionally, this method scales very poorly, 
which makes it unusable for any large scale WSNs. [35] [36] 
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The constraints of sensor nodes and impracticality of manual configuration has lead 
researchers to search for alternative secure localization solutions. The indirect localiza-
tion methods are based on nodes positioning themselves relative to other nodes in their 
vicinity. They were introduced to overcome the problems of direct localization methods, 
while still maintaining location accuracy. Most of the indirect localization methods are 
based on the use of beacon nodes. The beacon nodes, which know their own position, 
help sensor nodes determine their position. Beacon nodes are few in numbers in relation 
to sensor nodes, so they can be equipped with GPS receiver or their location can be 
manually configured. This method also has its own security problems. The beacon 
nodes often work in a same hostile environment as sensor nodes, so they can be suspect 
to physical node capture as well as other attacks. The possibility of beacon nodes pro-
viding wrong location information has to be taken into account. Other localization 
methods are examined in more detail in Chapter 4. [35] [36] 
3.5 Routing and data aggregation 
After the initial authentication and localization procedure, we need to consider security 
aspects of routing in WSNs. There are some excellent papers written on routing tech-
niques in WSNs [37] [4]. In short, WSN routing protocols can be classified based on the 
underlying network topology. Routing can be based on flat or hierarchical topology, or 
it can be completely location-based. In flat networks, each node typically plays the same 
role and nodes collaborate to perform the sensing and delivering information to the net-
work sink. The hierarchical topologies use cluster-based routing to optimize energy 
consumption by aggregating communication through more powerful nodes that are 
higher on the network hierarchy. On location based routing, nodes are addressed by 
their locations. Nodes have only knowledge of their direct neighbours and forward 
packets to the neighbours who are determined to be closer to the packet destination.  
Like traditional networks, most sensor network applications require protection 
against eavesdropping, injection and modification of packets [18]. Despite what type of 
routing protocol is used, WSNs are designed to transmit data produced by sensor nodes 
to sink nodes and further to the data processing server. Eavesdropping attacks are at 
particular interest of adversaries on this type of network. Passive eavesdropping of cer-
tain critical data streams on WSN might provide an adversary all the information of 
interest, with no need to risk detection by interfering network communication by inject-
ing or modifying data packets. Cryptography is the standard defence against the attacks 
listed above. Integrating cryptography to sensor networks results in certain trade-offs. 
In point-to-point communication, end-to-end cryptography achieves high level of 
security, but it requires key setup between all the end points. This makes encrypted 
communication incompatible with passive participation and local broadcast. Link-layer 
cryptography with a network wide shared key provides simple key setup and supports 
passive participation and local broadcast. However, a single shared key also makes 
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eavesdropping and packet modification easy for the adversary with the requirement of 
compromising just one of the intermediate nodes [18] 
Modern sensor nodes can be fitted with camera sensors that produce live video data 
streams. Such multimedia sensor networks can produce huge amounts of delay sensitive 
data and usually require in-network processing techniques to reduce the amount of in-
formation flowing in the network. This usually requires a hierarchical topology, where 
sink nodes, which work as aggregation points of incoming streams, need to completely 
decode encrypted packets. This requires computational complexity of the security algo-
rithms to be low enough to make real-time processing possible. There is hence a trade-
off between providing enhanced security to data flow by adopting higher order code at 
the source sensor node and permissible delay requirements. [27] [38] 
In the previous Section, we mentioned the considerable threat of physical node cap-
ture and described the Sybil attack it exposes WSNs. If an authenticated node is cap-
tured and replaced with a malicious node using the same key set, an adversary gains a 
possibility of launching Sybil attacks against WSN routing algorithms. The Sybil nodes 
can simply be in direct communication with other nodes, in which case the malicious 
device performing the attack will listen and reply to all the messages sent to Sybil 
nodes. The communication can also be indirect, where the malicious device claims to be 
able to reach the Sybil nodes. Messages sent to a Sybil node are routed through mali-
cious device, which pretends to pass on the message to a Sybil node. WSN routing in 
general is also particularly vulnerable to DoS attacks. A simple form of a DoS attack is 
to broadcast a high energy signal in an attempt to jam the network’s communication. 
[12] [39] 
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4 STANDARDS AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
IN WIRELESS SENSOR NETWORKS 
This Chapter will first shortly introduce some well established standards for WSNs 
from the security standpoint. Then the WSN research projects outside standardization 
work are introduced to provide solution propositions to challenges introduced in Chap-
ter 3. 
4.1 IEEE 802.15.4 
IEEE 802.15.4 is the core standard for majority of the wireless sensor networks. The 
802.15.4 specifies the physical layer (PHY) and MAC layer definition for  low-rate 
wireless personal area networks (LR-WPANs). Other WSN specifications, like ZigBee 
define upper layers of the OSI model and are based on 802.15.4. IEEE 802.15.4 can also 
be used with 6LoWPAN and standard Internet protocols. [40] [41] 
First version of IEEE 802.15.4 standard was released on 2003, following with sec-
ond release in 2006. The latest release was in 2011. The 2011 release added 802.15.11 
amendments from a through d to the standard, adding additional frequency ranges and 
PHY specifications to the standard. [40] 
The main focus of the 802.15.4 standard is to offer low-cost, low-power and low-
speed ubiquitous communication of nearby devices with very little underlying infra-
structure. The basic setting conceives a transfer rate of 250 kbit/s over a 10 meter com-
munications range. Latest 2011 version of 802.15.4 specifies five different frequency 
bands. These are 779-787 MHz (for China), 868,0-868,6 MHz (for Europe), 902-928 
MHz (for North America), 950-956 MHz (for Japan) and 2400-2483,5 MHz (for 
worldwide use). In addition to these frequencies a few optional ultra-wide bands are 
defined outside the mentioned frequency range. Physical layer requirements for 
802.15.4 devices vary depending on supported frequency bands. MAC scheme in 
802.15.4 is either carrier sense multiple access with collision avoidance (CSMA/CA) or 
ALOHA for lighter networks. [40] 
The 802.15.4 defines two different node types. Full-function device (FFD) imple-
ments functions to talk to any other device in a PAN area, serving as a network coordi-
nator. A FFD that only relays messages is a dubbed coordinator. The other node type is 
reduced-function device (RFD). These are basic nodes of the network with limited 
computation power and energy supply. They can only communicate with FFDs. [40] 
Network topology is either peer-to-peer ad-hoc network or a star network centered 
around a FFD node. A few more structured variations of these also exist. Applications 
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that typically use star topology include home automation, personal computer peripher-
als, games and personal health care. A peer-to-peer network also needs at least one FFD 
working as a network coordinator. Purpose of the peer-to-peer networks is to work as a 
basis for self-managing and self-organizing ad-hoc networks. Since 802.15.4 defines 
only PHY and MAC layers, routing algorithms are left for network layer solutions. [40] 
The 2011 version of 802.15.4 standard currently has three amendments, which all 
are either draft standards or approved standards already. These are: 802.15.4e (MAC 
modifications to better support industrial markets), 802.15f (support for active RFID 
sensor applications) and 802.15.4g (PHY specifications for smart metering utility net-
works). We will not go in to more detail on these amendments, as the problems pre-
sented in this thesis are mainly related to the higher layers of the protocols stack. [40] 
[42] 
4.2 Standards designed upon IEEE 802.15.4 and example 
sensor hardware 
Next, a few well known WSN standards built upon IEEE 802.15.4 definition are intro-
duced to establish an overview of the current standardization state of WSNs. The exam-
ple of typical sensor node hardware is also given. 
6LowPAN (IPv6 over Low power Wireless Personal Area Networks) is a standard 
developed by the corresponding working group in the IETF (Internet Engineering Task 
Force). The group finished its standardization work in 2012. The core idea of 
6LowPAN definition is to allow connectivity over IP to even smallest constrained de-
vices. 6LowPAN defines the methods for IPv6 packets to be communicated over IEEE 
802.15.4 based network [43]. IEEE 802.15.4 maximum frame size is much smaller than 
IPv6 frame size, so an adaptation layer is defined. 6LowPAN also redefines packet for-
mat and address management. 6LowPAN packets contain compressed header and short-
ened address to further reduce the IPv6 packet size. 6LowPAN adaptation layer is speci-
fied on top of the IEEE 802.15.4 specified physical and data-link layer. The adaptation 
layer allows the use of TCP/IP-based network layer protocols. From the security point 
of view, IPv6 offers an opportunity to take advantage of existing IP security architec-
ture. [44] [35] [23]  
Another well known standard in the WSN world is ZigBee. First ZigBee standard 
was made publicly available in June 2005. ZigBee defines the higher layer communica-
tion protocols built on the IEEE 802.15.4 standards. ZigBee defines three types of de-
vices. They are: ZigBee coordinator, ZigBee router and ZigBee end device. ZigBee 
routers and coordinators are IEEE 802.15.4 standard defined FFDs and end device can 
be either FFD or RDF. ZigBee coordinator is responsible for network formation, storing 
information and bridging separate ZigBee networks together. ZigBee routers link Zig-
Bee end devices together and form multi-hop connections with other ZigBee routers. 
ZigBee end devices are sensors, actuators and controllers that transmit data only to Zig-
Bee routers or coordinators. Message encryption in ZigBee networks is commonly 
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based on 128-bit AES encryption and symmetric keys. These keys are either link based 
or associated to the whole network. Keys are distributed through pre-installation, 
agreement or transportation. Transported keys are distributed through dedicated trust 
center. Initial communication with the trust center is done with a global master key, 
which is preloaded to the nodes. Master key is also used in key agreement, if link keys 
are negotiated between ZigBee routers and end devices. Latest versions of ZigBee stan-
dard also introduce public key cryptography based on Elliptic Curve Cryptography 
(ECC). [45] [35] 
WirelessHART is a standard specially designed for industrial use. This includes ap-
plications like process management and control applications, in addition to more sensor 
oriented applications. WirelessHART was first released in September 2007. Wireles-
sHART is an extension to the Highway Addressable Remote Transducer Protocol 
(HART). HART is one of the most popular industrial protocols today, as it can operate 
over legacy analog industrial wiring. WirelessHART uses 2,4GHz frequency specified 
in IEEE 802.15.4. The network consists of wireless field devices, gateways, process 
automation controller, host applications and a network manager. Wireless field devices 
communicate with host applications through gateways. Network manager configures the 
network and communication schedule and also handles routing. Network manager does 
not have to be separate entity and can be integrated to a gateway, host application or 
process automation controller. [46] [35] 
WirelessHART network security relies on additional entity called security manager, 
which manages network keys and collaborates with network manager. Security manager 
can be integrated application or a separate device. Like ZigBee, WirelessHART uses 
AES-128 encryption with different symmetric keys. WirelessHART security manager 
has many similarities to trust center in ZigBee. On WirelessHART, all wireless devices 
are preloaded with join keys. The devices send joining requests to Network Manager, 
which verifies the join key from security manager. Upon successful authentication, all 
the other keys are distributed to the device. [46] [47] 
A representative example of sensor hardware is the Mica mote
2
. The unit is a small, 
several cubic inch sensor/actuator with central processing unit (CPU), power source and 
radio. The unit can also be equipped with several optional sensing elements. The proc-
essor is a 8-bit 4MHz Atmel ATMEGA103 with 128 KB of instruction memory. The 
data random-access memory (RAM) size is 4 KB and 512 KB of flash memory is also 
available. The power consumption of CPU is 5,5 mA when active with 3 volt operating 
current. Sleep state power consumption is two orders of magnitude less. The radio is 
916 MHz low-power radio, delivering up to 40 Kbps bandwidth on a single shared 
channel with a range of up to few dozen meters. The radio consumes 4,8 mA of power 
in receive mode at 3 volt operating current and up to 12 mA  in transmit mode. Sleep 
mode power consumption is at 5 µA. Optional sensors are mounted on a sensor board. 
Sensor board allows mounting of temperature sensor, magnetomer, accelometer or mi-
crophone for example. The device is powered by two AA batteries, which provide ap-
proximately 2850 mA hours at 3 volts. This results in around 315 days of battery life 
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with one minute of CPU activity and one minute of radio transmitting and receiving in 
every hour. [48] 
4.3 Authentication and key distribution 
In current WSN standards, key management and authentication is loosely defined and 
available schemes are either insecure or rely heavily on connectivity to trusted base sta-
tion. Outside standardization work, there is a lot of other research available that define 
new key management propositions designed for WSNs. 
4.3.1 Solutions 
The possible key agreement schemes can be categorized to three types: the public-key 
schemes, the trusted server schemes and key predistribution schemes. We already men-
tioned that public key cryptography is not ideal for many WSNs, due to very limited 
processing power, memory and communication bandwidth of the sensor nodes. 
The trusted server schemes based on symmetric key cryptography depend on a 
trusted server for key agreement between the nodes, like Kerberos [49]. We also men-
tioned that this type of scheme is not particularly good for WSNs, due to high cost of 
base station nodes in relation to sensor nodes and scalability issues. In a WSN scale, the 
furthest sensor nodes may be several tens of hops away from the authentication base 
station, which makes this scheme very inefficient due to high energy cost of communi-
cation. The third approach to key agreement is to predistribute key information to all 
sensor nodes prior to deployment. This scheme can be seen as suitable candidate for 
WSN context. [50] 
At very extreme case, each node would contain a unique symmetric shared key for 
each other node in the network. This scheme guarantees strong resilience against adver-
saries taking advantage of compromised nodes. However, this solution is not viable for 
WSNs due to memory limitations of sensor nodes. Adding new nodes to the network 
also proves very problematic with this solution as we would need a secure way to de-
liver the new key to each node in the network to communicate with the newly deployed 
node. 
The basic random key pool based key predistribution scheme was developed by Es-
chauer and Gligor in 2002 [51]. The basic idea of the scheme is fairly simple. Each node 
is preloaded with a random subset of keys from a large key pool before deployment. To 
agree with communications, each pair of nodes needs to find a common key from their 
respective key pools. This key is used as their shared secret. It is not guaranteed that any 
given two nodes find a common shared key and thus be able to establish communica-
tions. However the key scheme is based on idea that probabilistically enough nodes find 
common keys to form a secure connected network. Furthermore, this probability can be 
adjusted by parameters like, key subset size and key pool size.  
Another paper further strengthens the random key pool scheme by introduction of  
q-composite scheme [28]. The difference is that any two nodes now need to find q (q > 
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1) common keys to derive a shared secret key. This solution prevents adversary eaves-
dropping a large number of communication channels in the network when a small num-
ber of nodes are compromised. This increased resilience comes at the cost of reduced 
resistance against large scale attacks. The requirement of having q common keys instead 
of just one reduces the probability of any given two nodes being able to form communi-
cations with each other. To achieve same communication probability with basic random 
key pool scheme, we need to decrease the size of the key pool, which in turn reduces the 
amount of nodes that attacker has to compromise to completely break the scheme. 
The q-composite key distribution scheme was further developed in 2005 in by Au-
thors W. Du, J. Deng, Y. Han et al. [50]. The authors introduce a proposition to enhance 
the q-composite key scheme by introducing multiple key spaces. The scheme works by 
formation of a key pool matrix from several separate key pools. Each node then receives 
a small sub-matrix key set from the key pool matrix. If any given two nodes find a suf-
ficient overlap in their respective key sets, they form a connection. The paper proves 
that this multi-space key distribution scheme provides the same probability of connec-
tion between any two given nodes with no additional memory requirement. The overall 
probabilistic security is also increased with the cost of additional computation require-
ments. The computation requirements still remain considerably smaller than in public 
key cryptographic schemes. 
We mentioned the Sybil attack being particularly harmful against WSNs. The Sybil 
attack is performed by first compromising nodes and extracting key information. This 
key information is used to generate Sybil nodes that an adversary tries to authenticate to 
the network. Key agreement scheme’s ability to resist passive eavesdropping attacks is 
at least in some relation to the ability to resist Sybil attacks, as both attacks take advan-
tage of the adversary’s pool of compromised keys. There has also been dedicated re-
search by J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song et al. on different key agreement schemes’ abil-
ity to resist Sybil attacks [12]. The authors introduce a key validation phase as an addi-
tional defence against Sybil attacks. The validation works by nodes challenging their 
neighbours for keys they claim to have. As the information of which keys the node has 
as part of its key set is public, the neighbouring node can challenge nearby node via 
picking a shared key from its own set and sending an encoded challenge using that key. 
The challenged node can reply with a correct message if it can successfully decode the 
challenge message. The full validation, meaning each node challenges all the other 
nodes in the network, is not practical. It causes unacceptable communication overhead 
and allows a possibility for DoS attacks. A partial validation means that each node chal-
lenges certain amount of its closest neighbours. The degree of validation must be chosen 
to make it sufficiently improbable for an adversary generated Sybil node to pass the 
validation. 
The research by J. Newsome, E. Shi, D. Song et al. also shows that the basic random 
key pool scheme is vulnerable to Sybil attacks without addition key validation phase 
[12]. Validation of 30 neighbouring nodes in a densely populated large WSN gives the 
scheme some protection, but it still lacks the resistance of q-composite- or multi-space 
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key distribution scheme. Out of the introduced key schemes, the multi-space key distri-
bution scheme proves to be most resistant to Sybil attacks, requiring an adversary to 
capture majority of the nodes in the network to achieve even minimal probability of 
creating a Sybil node. [12] 
The radio resource testing method has also been adapted to be more suitable for 
WSNs to offer protection against Sybil attacks [12]. The resource testing is based on an 
assumption that each device has only one radio, which is not able to receive or send on 
more than one channel at the time. When a node wants to verify that none of its 
neighbours are Sybil identities, it assigns each of its neighbours a different channel to 
listen. Then the node chooses a random channel on which to broadcast a hello message 
and then listen for a reply. If the neighbour that was assigned that channel is a legiti-
mate, it should hear the message and send a reply. The test can be repeated in order to 
achieve sufficient probability to detect Sybil nodes. 
The research paper by Y. Zhou, Y. Zhang and Y. Fang introduces a suggestion to 
strengthen security in authentication situations when individual nodes are added to the 
operating WSN [33]. The paper suggests introducing time stamps to the trusted third 
party certificates that nodes use to authenticate and join WSN based on PKI authentica-
tion system. The introduced time stamps could only offer a small time window in which 
a certain newly deployed node could bootstrap itself and join the WSN. After initial 
authentication, the communication could be encrypted via periodically changing sym-
metric keys. This makes it hard for an attacker to take advantage of certificates acquired 
along with captured nodes. 
4.3.2 Discussion 
The key predistribution schemes are at particular interest in the WSN concept. They 
have many design advantages that make them well suited for WSNs. However, the con-
cept of providing each node a random key set from a finite key pool makes the key pool 
generating and key pool providing server a single point of failure in the architecture. 
Nevertheless, all this communication can be done prior to deploying the sensor in the 
network. There is no need to connect the key pool server to the actual WSN, which de-
nies an adversary an opportunity to target this weakness with any attack through the 
WSN. Out of all the introduced predistribution schemes, the random multi-space key 
distribution scheme is most promising, offering superior security to other schemes with 
little additional cost in computation and transmission overhead. 
Despite obvious advantages, there are many disadvantages to the predistributed key 
schemes as well. One major disadvantage is that due to probabilistic connection forming, 
the predistributed key schemes achieve at best a partial mesh network topology. These 
key schemes are designed for very large sensor networks with over 1000 densely de-
ployed nodes with sizeable communication range resulting each node having over 20 
nodes within its communication range [28]. The probabilities dictate, that these condi-
tions will result fully connected and sufficiently redundant network. However, network 
efficiency is always lost with this scheme. Due to variance in the amount of formed 
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connections for each node, the traffic load and energy consumption is not well balanced. 
This can be detrimental to applications that rely on constant data streams that consume 
most of the node’s data transmission capacity. The traffic balancing can be improved by 
some degree with the use of a specified routing protocol, but it is done at the cost of 
transmission delay by increased buffering of data on the busy nodes or diverting data 
streams through longer routes. 
The radio resource testing can be used to add another layer of security against Sybil 
attacks despite what authentication or key distribution scheme is used. The verification 
is breakable with custom radio hardware, but it makes a larger scale attack increasingly 
costly and more difficult for an adversary. This compliments the fact that latest random 
key predistribution schemes are very resilient to smaller scale attacks. However, the 
radio resource testing increases energy consumption in a form of additional transmis-
sion overhead. The increased security level must be weighed against other requirements 
for the particular WSN application. 
Another Sybil attack protection method not previously mentioned in this thesis is 
position verification [12]. The method relies on the assumption that Sybil nodes should 
appear exactly at the same position as the malicious node that generates them. The 
WSN specific problem of this approach is that sensor nodes are physically very small 
and on many applications, nodes are randomly deployed to the environment. This makes 
it possible to legitimate nodes to reside on each other as well. We will discuss this 
method of verification in more detail with the concept of VANETs, as there is much 
research available on the subject. Some of the methods could be suited for WSNs, but in 
general, these methods cause relatively high communication overhead, which will 
greatly affect energy consumption of constrained sensor nodes. 
Finally, the introduced timestamping method along with PKI authentication can be 
considered highly beneficial. This method also increases protection against DoS attacks 
that are particularly harmful against constrained WSN nodes when using a public key 
authentication. When timestamps are used, the node receiving the authentication mes-
sage can decrypt the timestamp part of the certificate first and discard the message right 
away if the timestamp is not valid, without evaluating rest of the message. This saves 
processing power and therefore also device’s limited energy reserves. 
4.4 Secure localization 
We introduced the problem of nodes determining their geographical position and rela-
tive position in the WSN, known as localization. We already briefly mentioned the pos-
sibility of including GPS unit on the nodes or manual location preconfiguration as direct 
localization approaches. As direct approaches have proven infeasible for many WSN 
applications, several indirect approaches have been developed. 
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4.4.1 Solutions 
One proposition for indirect localization is called Spotlight [20]. Spotlight relies on ex-
ternal Spotlight device, which performs all the localization related calculation. The 
Spotlight device is equipped with a laser light source that can be pointed freely to the 
sensor nodes in the known terrain. The Spotlight device generates controlled events in 
the area where sensors are deployed. The area of affected sensors is called a lightened 
sensor area. Using time events perceived by a sensor node and spatio-temporal proper-
ties of the generated events, spatial information regarding the sensor node can be con-
structed.[35] [20] 
Another proposed solution is Radio Interferometric Positioning System (RIPS) [52]. 
The system works by using two external radio transmitters to create an interference sig-
nal. The transmitters are placed on different locations and create a signal with slightly 
different frequencies. At least two sensor nodes need to calculate the phase offset of the 
observed signals. The relative phase offset is a function of the relative positions between 
the two transmitters, the receivers and the carrier frequency. This information can be 
used to calculate the relative locations of two sensor nodes, or the actual location of the 
sensor nodes, if the location of the radio source is known. [35] [52] 
Another possibility for indirect localization is to use Moore’s algorithm. The re-
searchers have shown that distributed localization algorithm can work without the use of 
GPS or any kind of beacon nodes [53]. This method also works robustly with noisy dis-
tance measurements. The method is based on the use of robust quadrilateral. A robust 
quadrilateral is a fully connected quadrilateral, whose four sub-triangles are robust. [35] 
The algorithm has three phases. First the cluster localization phase starts by each 
node becoming the center of the cluster and measuring the distance of its one-hop 
neighbours. This information is then broadcasted to the neighbours. For each cluster, 
each node computes the complete set of robust quadrilinears. Position estimations for a 
local coordinate system are computed for as many nodes as possible. This is done by 
using the overlap graph formed from broadcasted information of overlapping clusters. 
The second phase is the cluster optimization phase. This is done by using numerical 
optimization, like spring relaxation. The last phase is cluster transformation phase. In 
this phase, nodes compute a transformation between local coordinate system of con-
nected clusters. The transformation computes the rotation, translation and possible re-
flection that best aligns the nodes of two local coordinate systems. The paper proves 
that in a case of high measurement noise, the nodes with unreliable measurement data 
are excluded from the quadrilinear formation process. This results to an algorithm form-
ing a correct network topology with high probability, or not being able to form it all, if 
the measurement noise is high enough and node connectivity is low. [35] [53] 
The several secure indirect localization methods have been also provided. One of 
them is called SeRloc [54]. It is based on a set of directional antenna equipped locator 
nodes that provide sensor nodes their location. The main idea of the system is that each 
locator node transmits a different beacon at each antenna sector. The beacon message 
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consists of locator coordinates and angles of directional antenna boundary lines. The use 
of directional antennas also improves localization accuracy and also results in an adver-
sary having to impersonate several beacon nodes to compromise localization process. 
[35] [36] 
Another secure indirect localization method is called secure positioning method in 
sensor networks (SPINE) [55]. SPINE is based on verifiable multilateration, which we 
will go into more detail in the context of VANETs. In short, SPINE works by distance 
bounding each sensor node to at least three reference points to calculate its position. The 
amount of reference points is relatively high in comparison to other beaconing methods, 
which is a definite drawback on this method. [35] [36] 
Yet another secure indirect localization method is called a robust positioning system 
in WSNs (ROPE) [56]. ROPE is a hybrid algorithm. First part of the algorithm allows 
sensors to determine their location without any centralized computation. The second 
part of the algorithm is a location verification mechanism which verifies the location 
claims of the sensors prior to any data collection. ROPE defines the WSN node types as 
sensor and locator nodes. Sensor nodes share a pairwise key with every locator node. As 
the number of locators in the network is considerably smaller, this will not cause con-
siderable memory requirement to the sensor nodes. 
4.4.2 Discussion 
Localization in WSNs has three important aspects to consider: energy efficiency, accu-
racy and security. The first two have been researched for nearly a decade, but the atten-
tion of researchers has shifted to security aspect of localization only in the recent years. 
[36] 
The first indirect localization method introduced, Spotlight has certain advantages 
over the others. The Spotlight device is a single point of failure in the network and defi-
nitely a point of interest for any adversary. But because only one Spotlight device is 
required, it can be tamper-proofed and supervised with considerably less effort. Spot-
light system is also proved accurate over long distances and scalable to large WSNs 
[20]. 
The second solution, RIPS, requires two fairly simple radio transmitters to create an 
interference signal, which is not a heavy hardware requirement. As the localization 
process depends on receiving signals from both transmitters, they also become single 
point of failure. Another downside of the system is that every node needs to collaborate 
with at least one other node to calculate its own position. Collaboration can be done 
with several neighbouring nodes to make it impossible for an adversary to disturb local-
ization process with a small number of captured nodes, which slightly increases com-
munication overhead. 
The localization method based on Moore’s algorithm was developed for sensor net-
works with no additional positioning hardware available, but it is considerably more 
challenging to secure. The system excludes nodes with very noisy or incomplete dis-
tance measurements from quadrilinear formation phase, so proving falsified information 
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at this phase is not very beneficial for any adversary. However, the next phase of the 
protocol works by node sending its localization information to neighbour, the neighbour 
stitching received and its localization information together and sending it to the next 
node on the line. This allows any compromised node on the line to falsify a large 
amount of localization information, most likely corrupting the localization for a signifi-
cant part of the network. These attacks can be resisted to some degree by implementing 
majority voting and plausibility checks to the later localization steps. This will however 
increase communication overhead and allows additional DoS attacks. 
Majority of the more recent localization methods that have been already much con-
sidered from the security aspect, are based on the use of beacon nodes. On most beacon 
node scenarios, there are two key elements to make localization process secure. If the 
beacon node sends the location information to the sensor node over the network, this 
communication needs to be secure. Additionally, network needs to be able to resist at-
tacks based on captured beacon nodes. 
The lastly introduced method, ROPE, has a simple idea of securing communication 
between sensor nodes and beacon nodes via a preshared pairwise key. As we discussed 
in the context of authentication, the preshared pairwise keys offer the best resistance to 
node capture with a little computation overhead, but they are not viable option in the 
direct communication between sensor nodes due to limited memory space for the key 
storage. However, as the number of beacon nodes is far less than sensor nodes, the 
memory requirement lowers considerably. Nevertheless, this method still has the down-
side of destroyed or captured beacon nodes being impossible to replace in the deployed 
network. 
The resistance to captured beacon nodes can be achieved by beacon nodes monitor-
ing each other and reporting misbehaving nodes to sensor nodes in a majority voting 
principle. The network is also naturally resistant to beacon node capture if sensor nodes 
are able to receive beacons from several beacon nodes, in which they can choose from 
which to use for localization information. In this case, the sensor nodes can directly de-
tect the beacon nodes sending suspicious localization information. 
There is a wide variety of localization methods available, each having different 
hardware requirements, strong and weak points in security. Few introduced propositions 
can be considered strongly secured with relatively inexpensive additional hardware re-
quired [20] [52]. Still, the practicality of using any additional hardware depends highly 
on the WSN application. For example, the introduced Spotlight system might work very 
well in an environmental monitoring or a military application. The sensor nodes can be 
deployed from an aerial vehicle. The vehicle could act as a Spotlight device as well, 
lightening the deployed area and completing sensor node localization process right after 
deployment. Being an aerial vehicle, the Spotlight device would be harder to target for a 
potential adversary. Other introduced propositions [52] [56] have similar advantages 
and disadvantages and work best in a scenario where the additional hardware used is 
well suited for the application and environment and the weak points in security can be 
covered by other means. 
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4.5 Routing and data aggregation 
As discussed in Chapter 3, after the initial authentication and localization procedure is 
completed and routing is initiated, we need to consider attacks against operating WSNs. 
On many scenarios, adversaries are able to capture authenticated nodes that are already 
participating WSN communication, which offers adversaries a direct way to disrupt 
WSN routing protocols. Many routing protocols are designed with very little attention 
to security and completely securing existing WSN routing protocol is usually not possi-
ble [48]. Still, there is some research available on secure routing protocol design, as 
well as attempts to secure existing WSN routing protocols. 
4.5.1 Solutions 
An early proposition for secure WSN is called an Intrusions-tolerant routing protocol 
for wireless sensor networks (INSENS) [57]. INSENS is based on flat network topol-
ogy, where network consist of sensor nodes and a single base station which also acts as 
a data sink. The authors of the paper focus on securing routing against sensor node cap-
ture and make an assumption that network base station is secured from physical access. 
Also direct communication between sensor nodes is not supported. The base station 
communicates with the sensor nodes via one-way sequence number to prevent spoofing 
attacks. The base station is the only entity in the network that is allowed to use broad-
casting. The sensor nodes can only use unicast and only communicate with base station 
to prevent DoS attacks. The communication between individual sensor nodes and the 
base station is secured with a unique preshared pairwise key. All control routing infor-
mation must be authenticated through base station, which makes it harder for an adver-
sary to inject malicious routing information the network. Finally, the routing protocol is 
designed to form redundant multipath routing tables to increase the amount of nodes an 
adversary needs to capture to disable parts of the network. 
A proposition to secure an existing WSN routing protocol, Implicit Geographic 
Forwarding (IGF) has been made [58] [59]. IGF is a stateless location based routing 
protocol, without dependence on knowing the network topology or the presence or ab-
sence of any other nodes. It allows receiving nodes to determine a packet’s next-hop at 
transmission time coupling routing and MAC components into a single Network/MAC 
protocol. [58] 
The secure version of the routing protocol is called Secure Implicit Geographic for-
warding (SIGF). SIGF consists of three protocols, each adding new security features to 
the previous. SIGF-0 is a stateless protocol based on probabilistic defences. SIGF-1 
uses local history and node reputation evaluation to protect against certain attacks. 
SIGF-2 uses neighbourhood-shared state to provide stronger security guarantees. 
As IGF has no routing tables, it naturally confines attacker’s impact to the 
neighbourhood and prevents spoofing, altering or dropping routing information. Single 
attacker can still perform a simple blackhole attack in the local neighbourhood by pre-
tending to be best node for next-hop relay. When a legitimate node has data packet to 
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relay, it sends an Open Ready To Send (ORTS) –request. A malicious node replies im-
mediately with a Clear To Send (CTS) -reply. After the malicious node is chosen as a 
next-hop relay, it can send a confirmation message of receiving and forwarding the data 
packets (ACK) and still drop the actual data packets (DATA). [58] [59] 
The probabilistic defences included in SIGF-0 consist of configurable receiving an-
gles in which CTS messages are listened from forwarding area, waiting for several CTS 
replies and different options to choose forwarding candidates. SIGF-1 adds additional 
layer of protection by nodes keeping statistics about their neighbours. Each node col-
lects following statistics from each of its neighbours: packets sent to a node for forward-
ing, the number of packets that node has forwarder on this node’s behalf, last claimed 
location of the neighbouring node and average response delay of a node. Other parame-
ters are calculated using these statistics to from a node reputation value. If the value 
drops below threshold, the node is excluded from forwarding decisions. SIGF-2 as-
sumes that authentication scheme is used that provides pairwise keys between 
neighbours and offers encryption of up to all the protocol messages (ORTS, CTS, AKC 
and DATA). This will offer protection from replay based DoS attacks at the cost of in-
creased communication and calculation overhead. 
The specific problem of securing multimedia streams in sensor networks is an ex-
ample of a problem caused by limitations in sensor node hardware. The problem is ad-
dressed in a paper consisting of lightweight security principles for multimedia WSNs 
[38]. The paper introduces novel modifications to existing hardware to for analog-to-
digital and digital-to-analog conversions. The modifications allow analog data streams 
to be encrypted via symmetric key conversion phase, adding very little additional power 
requirements and transmission overhead. The solution effectively allows sensor nodes 
to be equipped with symmetric key cryptography capable hardware. 
4.5.2 Discussion 
Routing in WSNs is a much researched and challenging subject. Due to constrained 
nature of WSNs, the performance and reliability considerations have left security with a 
little attention on routing protocol design [48] [37] [4].  
The introduced INSENS routing algorithm shows how implementing security fea-
tures sets limitations to WSNs. The routing protocol can be considered fairly secure, but 
at heavy cost in communication overhead and network scalability. As each node shares 
pairwise key with the base station, data decryption is not possible on the intermediate 
nodes. This prevents data aggregation and results in scalability issues as data streams 
from all the WSN nodes are directed to the base station. This effect will also be ampli-
fied by the fact that all control routing messages are also authenticated through base 
station. 
The SIGF protocol offers a good overview of measures available to secure routing 
in WSNs. The location based routing is immune to some of the attacks against WSN 
routing protocols, but few common attacks still remain viable. The simple configuration 
methods of SIGF-0 offer a significant increase in defence against simple blackhole at-
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tacks. The reputation system in SIGF-1 increases the network performance under vari-
ety of attacks and offers protection against simple Sybil attacks. More advanced Sybil 
attacks can still go undetected, as malicious nodes can pretend forwarding messages to 
non-existent Sybil nodes, which will satisfy the sender’s message forwarding check. An 
adversary can still disrupt the neighbourhood communication by simple DoS attack 
based on replicating observed legitimate messages. DoS attacks can be prevented using 
SIGF-2 and adding sequence number to encrypted messages. Advanced Sybil attack 
protection requires nodes collaborating on detection of malicious and Sybil nodes via 
trust ratings. 
In general, WSN protocol design should take advantage of wide deployment area 
and multiple routing paths available. Node capture can be resisted by sending packets 
along multiple paths and checking consistency in the destination. Important routing de-
cisions should also require multiple reports before response is made. A wide area of 
deployment makes also a typical DoS attack to only affect a fraction of the network. 
Detection methods and solutions have been developed to avoid routing traffic through 
jammed area [39]. However, the presented solutions are still far from optimal. [18] [60] 
Implementing cryptography always entails a performance cost for extra computation 
and often increased packet size. Cryptographic hardware support increases efficiency, 
but also increases the financial cost of the nodes. Therefore, the decision to use dedi-
cated hardware highly depends on the application context. It can be argued that a rea-
sonable level of security can be achieved with software-only cryptographic implementa-
tions on most of the WSN applications that do not require large streams of real-time 
data. Still, the dedicated hardware is well suited on multimedia WSNs with video 
streaming nodes. [18] 
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5 SECURITY CHALLENGES IN VEHICULAR 
COMMUNICATIONS 
 
Vehicular communications is a distinctly separate IoT application field. The topic has 
been researched for over two decades now and wide availability and low-cost of global-
positioning systems (GPS) and wireless local area network (WLAN) transceivers has 
made it a step closer to reality. 
Vehicular communication systems that enable cooperative applications to improve 
road safety and traffic efficiency are generally called Intelligent Transportation Systems 
(ITS). Vehicular applications can be roughly classified into either ITS applications or 
non-ITS applications. Non-ITS applications are driver and passenger oriented applica-
tions, which include Internet connections and multimedia services. They are usually 
commercial and comfort applications. ITS applications include route guidance, traffic 
control, public transportation management, electronic payment services, onboard safety 
and security monitoring, collision avoidance and disaster response and evacuations. 
They present the primary vision of vehicular applications and we mainly focus on them 
in this work. [61] [62] 
In a more recent classification, European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI) has classified vehicular applications into three classes: road safety, traffic effi-
ciency and other applications. Other applications include business and comfort applica-
tions and it is similar classification to non-ITS applications. Road safety applications are 
defined to decrease number of road accidents. They can be further classified into two 
classes: driver assistance applications and actions on vehicle applications. The purpose 
of driver assistance applications is to assist driver to avoid road dangers and accidents. 
Actions on vehicle applications provide necessary information to vehicle systems to 
avoid and reduce damage of accidents. The main difference is that in the former cate-
gory, driver is responsible of evaluating the relevance of received data. [62] 
5.1 Example use scenario 
Imagine a scenario, where an emergency vehicle, like an ambulance approaches a four-
way intersection. Vehicle’s on-board unit (OBU) could send an alert to the other vehi-
cles and to the road-side unit (RSU) controlling the traffic lights. Traffic lights for the 
incoming traffic from the other directions would turn red in advance. The drivers would 
be alerted of an incoming emergency vehicle and if necessary, their cars would be 
autonomously slowed down. 
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The presented scenario features several types of ITS applications, including both 
types of road safety applications. Driver assistance applications and actions on vehicle 
applications provide multiple layers of road safety assistance. Driver assistance applica-
tions typically generate information and sound or light alarms between two and 30 sec-
onds before collision in order to give enough time for driver to take appropriate actions. 
On actions on vehicle applications, decision and actions are automatically initiated by 
vehicle systems a few seconds before highly probable event like crash. These are the 
most sophisticated road safety applications and require a high level of security to be 
operational. Most of the European and American ITS related standards and projects 
focus on driver assistance applications as they will be first deployed cooperative road 
safety applications. Driver assistance applications are also currently defined as primary 
road safety applications by many OEMs. [62] 
5.2 Relevant PHY and MAC layer restrictions 
When defining security requirements for road safety applications, we will first shortly 
examine OSI-models’ PHY and MAC layers associated with vehicular communications 
as they have some special characteristics that affect practicality of possible security so-
lutions. Moving vehicles add special requirements to the network, like: long operation 
range, nodes moving at high speeds, extreme multipath environments, multiple overlap-
ping ad hoc networks and extremely high quality of service (QoS) in some emergency 
scenarios [61]. High mobility of nodes and extreme multipath environments present 
unique challenges to the wideband communication. Vehicle-to-vehicle communication 
channel is “doubly selective”. This means that frequency response varies significantly 
over signal bandwidth, and its time fluctuations happen in the course of a symbol period 
[63]. 
Although current cellular networks enable voice communication and certain infor-
mational services to drivers and passengers, they are far from optimal solution for direct 
vehicle-to-vehicle and vehicle-to-roadside communications, which is the main form of 
communication in VANETs. VANET applications, like the presented emergency-
response vehicle scenario, require extremely reliable and minimal-latency method of 
message delivery. The main challenge is that on most of the scenarios, communication 
is decentralized and no control can be assumed. Moreover, because there is no hand-
shaking, many applications will be broadcasting their information to surrounding cars. 
This may cause channel throughput degeneration in case of sudden emergencies, like 
collisions. On congested roads, this leads to the requirement of a dedicated control 
channel. The well known problem of hidden and exposed nodes is also particularly 
problematic in a vehicle-to-vehicle communication scenario. The distance between the 
moving nodes varies constantly, which makes the occurrence of the problems unpre-
dictable. 
Several different approaches have been proposed to solve these medium access con-
trol (MAC) related issues. The main focus today is using the IEEE 802.11 carrier sense 
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multiple access (CSMA) based MAC for direct vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-roadside 
communications. Even though CSMA adds unwanted random elements to MAC, it has 
an advantage of good availability of supporting hardware and low implementation costs. 
[64] [65] 
Another current challenge is the bandwidth range of the VANET channels, which 
ranges from 10 to 20 MHz. With a high number of nodes within transmission range 
from each other, the congestion becomes a significant issue. Use of multiple channels 
leads to the channel synchronization and co-channel interference problems, which will 
add more complexity to MAC definition. [64] [65] 
5.3 Authentication and data-centric trust 
As we continue up to OSI-model’s network layer, the first big security related issue is 
authentication. Providing reliable authentication and authenticity maintaining methods 
is a different kind of challenge in VANETs in comparison to WSNs. While VANET 
nodes are lifted from many processing power and energy consumption constraints, the 
communication channel remains very challenging due to the high mobility of nodes. 
The constantly changing network topology and public nature of the network also sets 
different requirements and restrictions to authentication scheme. 
The problematic feature of VANETs is that every vehicle on the road has, and also 
on most situations, should have an ability to access and join the network. When 
VANETs will be widely deployed, majority of the nodes on the roads will be privately 
owned cars. Any of these cars can be legitimately registered and owned, along with 
proper certificates and still belong to an attacker. This presents a problem, as a node 
with a previously trustworthy communication record still has the potential of turning 
into a hostile one. These attackers can be classified as malicious insiders as they have 
joined the network with a proper authentication procedure and can be considered as 
valid members of the network before the initiation of the attack. It can be argued that 
relying on traditional authentication procedure as a sole method of providing authentic-
ity is not practical in VANET, as there is a certain trust problem even between two le-
gitimately authenticated nodes. However, VANETs also differ from many other net-
works by having considerable presence of governmental authorities and other special 
entities. Many applications, like our emergency-response vehicle scenario can greatly 
benefit if a certain node can reliably authenticate itself as an emergency vehicle, police 
car, or a government controlled RSU controlling the traffic lights, for example. Reliable 
vehicle identities are also useful for liability reasons, which we will introduce in the 
following Section. 
In many other networks, authentication and message encryption can be done with 
self-organized trust management system, like PGP (Pretty Good Privacy). Self-
organized trust management systems rely on using public key pairs for authentication 
and setting up private keys for further communication. However, as malicious insiders 
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have easy access to VANETs, there is a need for trusted third party authority, which 
implies the need of PKI (Public Key Infrastructure). [66] 
In addition to trust issues, we need to examine technical limitations of the authenti-
cation procedure. Current vehicular communication systems have maximum range of 
about one kilometre [65]. This combined with the fact that nodes move at relatively 
high speeds allows only a few seconds of communication time before connectivity is 
lost. This presents a serious challenge for the authentication procedure. Authentication 
needs to be completed with as few message transactions as possible to fulfil the low-
latency requirements. Public key cryptography introduces additional overhead to the 
messages, which increases message transmission time and latency. This overhead can 
be kept on an acceptable level by using a compact cryptosystem. ECC is by far the most 
viable candidate for VANETs. [66] [67] [68] 
Under a PKI solution, safety messages sent by vehicle are signed with its private 
key and a certificate signed by the CA (Certificate Authority). Receiving vehicle uses 
the certificate to extract and verify the public key of the sender and then verifies the 
message’s contents by using the public key. This scheme reduces the number of mes-
sage transactions required between communicating nodes compared to self-organized 
trust management systems, making it more ideal solution considering latency require-
ments in VANET communication.[66] 
The use of secret information like private keys incurs the need for a Tamper-Proof 
Device (TPD) in every vehicle. In addition to storing secret information, this device is 
also responsible for signing outgoing messages. To reduce the risk of being compro-
mised by attackers, this device needs to have its own battery, which can be charged 
from the vehicle’s battery. The device also needs to have a clock, which can be securely 
synchronized when passing a trusted roadside base station, for example. The access to 
this device should be restricted to authorized people. TPD’s cryptographic keys could 
be renewed during vehicle’s periodic technical checkup. [66] 
When a PKI based solution is used, there are a few different candidates for CAs. 
Considering the involvement of authorities in vehicle registration, governmental trans-
portation authorities are likely candidates. The main problem is that vehicles are certi-
fied by a regional authority in a given country, but vehicles from different regions and 
countries should also be able to authenticate with each other. This problem can be usu-
ally solved by including certificate chain leading to a common authority, but in 
VANETs this would create unacceptable message overhead. This leads to a requirement 
of registering each vehicle to the local certificate authority to replace the certificate 
chain with a single certificate of transit or destination region. This requires governmen-
tal cooperation. Another candidate for CA could be vehicle manufacturers, given a lim-
ited number of trust already endowed in them by government authorities, but most 
likely governments aren’t very inclined to involve non-governmental institutions in law-
enforcement mechanisms. The advantage on using PKI in VANETs is also accompanied 
by other challenging problems, notably certificate revocation. The certificates of a de-
tected attacker or malfunctioning device need to be revoked. [66] [68] 
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In many vehicular applications, like in our emergency-response vehicle scenario, the 
trustworthiness of the data is top priority, even over the trustworthiness of the nodes 
transmitting this data. This combined with strict technical limitations for authentication 
procedure has led many security solutions to the direction of data-centric trust and veri-
fication. If other nodes, namely the traffic light controlling RSU and other cars ap-
proaching the intersection can verify the trustworthiness of the emergency message 
solely by examining message contents and other available data, there is no need to 
waste time on a complicated authentication procedure between different nodes. The use 
of PKI can be classified as proactive data-centric trust security concept, but there is a 
smaller scale of studies on reactive security concepts. Data-centric trust and verification 
needs to provide security means to ensure that in-transit traffic tampering and imper-
sonation attacks can be detected by the receiver of the message. Solutions are presented 
in more detail in Section 6.3. [68] 
5.4 Geo-addressing and secure localization 
After authentication, the next big security issue is how to manage an addressing sys-
tem used by routing protocol and also by many applications, like the collision avoidance 
system in our emergency-response vehicle scenario. Routing in VANETs differs from 
traditional Internet routing as well as from routing in other ad hoc networks, like WSNs. 
In traditional Internet, as well as in majority of WSNs, routing is done by using 
topological prefixes. Due to rapidly changing topology in VANETs, a topology based 
routing becomes problematic. Additionally, many VANET applications, like the pre-
sented emergency-response vehicle scenario require that the messages include the 
physical position or at least geographic region in which the vehicle is located in. This 
has lead to the use of position based routing protocols. However, in comparison to 
WSNs, the public nature and massive scale of VANETs requires specific solutions in 
managing geographic information associated with vehicles. High mobility of vehicles 
makes tracking and managing these “geo-addresses” an extremely challenging task. [69] 
Integrating physical location information to the current design of Internet can be 
roughly categorized to three different families of solutions. These are: application layer 
solutions, GPS-multicast solution and unicast IP routing extended to deal with GPS ad-
dresses. GPS-addresses can be represented by using closed polygons, such as circle with 
center point- and radius attributes. Any node residing in the area of the polygon is able 
to receive message addressed to that polygon. [70] [71]  
Application layer solutions use an extended DNS (Domain Name System) scheme 
to resolve geographical position. DNS system is extended to include database of geo-
addresses, which contains directory of information, down to the level of IP address of 
each base station and coordinates of a polygon representing base stations’ coverage 
area. [71] 
GPS-multicast solution to addressing uses GPS Multicast Routing Scheme (GPSM). 
GPSM is based on atoms and partitions. Atom represents the smallest geographic area 
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that can have a multicast address. A partition is a larger geographic area that contains a 
number of atoms and also has its own geographic multicast address. A partition could 
represent a country, town or state. The working principle of this protocol is to approxi-
mate the addressing polygon of the smallest partition inside current larger partition and 
use multicast address of the approximated partition as the IP address of the message. 
GPSM has an advantage of being flexible mix between application level filtering for the 
geographic address and multicast. [69] [72] 
Unicast IP routing solution extended to deal with GPS addresses is used in several 
promising propositions. Geometric Routing Scheme (GEO) uses polygonal geographic 
destination to form GPS-cast header used directly for routing. GEO routing is based on 
virtual network, formed by GPS-address routers. GPS-routers use GPS-cast header for 
routing overlayed in current IP network. Geographic Positioning Extension for IPv6 
(GPIPv6) defines geographical positioning information to be distributed in IPv6 frames. 
This can be done by introducing two new option types for IPv6. These are GPIPv6 
source and GPIPv6 destination, used for signaling sender’s and receiver’s geographic 
position. Using unicast prefixes to target multicast group members has also been pro-
posed. This is an extension to the IPv6 architecture that uses unicast prefix for multicast 
address allocation. These new multicast addresses are used to target multicast group 
members within certain geographic area. [69] [72] 
After the introduction of methods to integrate the geo-addressing information to 
VANET routing, there is also a need to mention about multihopping requirements in the 
context of this work.  A typical feature of ad hoc networks, like WSNs, is multihopping. 
However, VANET safety applications, like our example scenario, rely mainly on broad-
casted emergency messages. Additionally, dedicated short-range communications 
(DSRC) specifications used in VANETs require safety messages to be transmitted with 
a sufficient power to warn vehicles in a range of 10 seconds travel time. Due to these 
reasons, multihopping is not required when delivering most delay-sensitive safety mes-
sages. Nevertheless, some form of multihopping is still required. Vehicles that receive 
warning messages estimate whether the reported problems can also affect their follow-
ers. In this case they will forward message to them. [66] 
From the security perspective, the first requirement for geo-addressing solution is to 
provide a reliable method of associating position information with messages. However, 
this has to be done in a way that the protocol is able to resist attacks designed to deliber-
ately retrieve and track the location of vehicles. We refer this ability as secure localiza-
tion in the VANET context. Methods to provide secure localization are similar to meth-
ods of resisting Denial of Service attacks. Implementations of secure localization solu-
tions may vary depending on chosen geo-addressing solution. [69] 
One proposed solution for secure localization is tamper-proof GPS system [73]. On 
a concept level, the receiver could register its location at all times and would provide 
this information to other nodes in the network in an authentic manner. The main prob-
lem with this solution is the limited availability in urban environments. Current GPS 
systems do not provide reliable reception on bridges, or in tunnels etc. GPS-based sys-
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tems also offer an attacker a several new ways to attack the system without tampering 
the system hardware, like blocking or spoofing the signal from GPS satellites. More-
over, these attacks can be performed by fairly unsophisticated adversaries [74]. More 
viable solutions are in Section 6.4. 
5.5 Anonymity, liability and privacy 
On our emergency-response vehicle scenario, all the receiving nodes of the safety mes-
sage sent by the emergency vehicle need to be able to trust that the entity that generated 
this information really is the emergency vehicle. This is required even if the message 
has been forwarded by other nodes, like privately owned cars on the way. At the same 
time the privacy of the drivers of these privately owned cars needs to be protected. In 
many countries, this is even enforced by laws. 
For liability reasons, VANETs also have a requirement to disclose certain commu-
nicated information and its origin to governmental authorities, like police. This informa-
tion is useful in controlling traffic violations and in traffic accident investigation. At-
tacking VANET communications also offers an imaginative attacker a new way to ac-
complish crimes. Imagine a chaos that can be caused by compromising the presented 
emergency-response vehicle scenario. If there is no way to backtrack identities of nodes 
participating in a security attack, attacks could even be designed to perform a homicide, 
looking like an accident.  
One of the main challenges of VANETs is to provide a solution that is able to sup-
port tradeoff between the authentication, liability and privacy. To ensure anonymity and 
privacy, cryptographically protected messages should not allow their sender to be iden-
tified. Furthermore, it should be difficult to link together two or more messages sent by 
the same node. [69] 
Several solutions suggest protecting vehicle’s privacy with anonymous vehicle iden-
tities. These can be based on electronic identity issued by a government called an Elec-
tronic License Plate (ELP) [73], or alternatively an Electronic Chasis Number (ECN) 
issued by the vehicle manufacturer. These identities need to be unique and crypto-
graphically verifiable in a case the vehicle needs to be identified to the government au-
thority. Cryptographic verification can be done by attaching a certificate issued by CA 
to the identity. Like physical license plates, ELP should only be changed when the 
owner of the vehicle changes or vehicle is registered to a different state or country. [66] 
Direct authentication between other nodes is done by using public/private key pairs 
authenticated by CA. These key pairs are authenticated to vehicle’s ELP or ECN by CA, 
but do not contain any information about the connection, so the actual identity of the 
vehicle cannot be discovered by eavesdropping attacker. These key pairs can also be 
referred to as pseudonyms. This protects vehicle’s anonymity against unauthorized 
nodes, but preserves conditional liability towards authorized entities, like government 
authorities. [66] 
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To prevent vehicle tracking by eavesdropping, each vehicle needs to have a set of 
authenticated public/private key pairs to be used. Each key pair is only used for a certain 
time period and when all the keys have been used or their lifetimes have expired, the 
key set needs to be renewed. This introduces scalability issues as the number of keys 
each vehicle has to store can be huge on congested roads. The method of periodically 
renewing the vehicle’s key set also needs to be defined. Options to solve these issues are 
discussed in Section 6.5. 
 39 39  
6 STANDARDS AND SECURITY SOLUTIONS 
IN VEHICULAR COMMUNICATIONS 
This Chapter will first introduce some well established VANET standards. Then we will 
continue to some more recent standardization work and research projects that provide 
solution propositions to issues introduced in Chapter 5. 
6.1 WAVE framework 
In 1999, the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FFC) granted 75 MHz of 
spectrum in the 5,85-5,925 GHz range for the use the dedicated short-range communica-
tions in intelligent transportation systems [61]. The initial effort at standardizing DSRC 
radio technology took place in ASTM 2313 working group. FCC rules and orders spe-
cially referenced this document for DSRC spectrum usage rules. [75]  
In 2004, this standardizing effort migrated to the IEEE 802.11 standard group as DSRC 
radio technology is essentially IEEE 802.11a adjusted to low overheads operations in 
the DSRC spectrum. IEEE assigned a new task group for DSRC [75]. This task group 
started working on the amendment to the IEEE 802.11 specification. The amendment is 
known as IEEE 802.11p WAVE (Wireless Access in Vehicular Environments). 
Currently, WAVE framework consists of IEEE 802.11p standard, and IEEE 1609 fam-
ily of standards. IEEE 802.11p defines PHY and lower parts of MAC layer for vehicular 
communications with nodes moving up to 200 km/h. IEEE 1609 -family of standards 
continue to define upper levels of MAC layers and specify certain aspects of 802.11p. 
Majority of research efforts and projects in USA are based on WAVE standards [69]. 
WAVE is fully intended to serve as an international standard applicable in other parts of 
the world as well as in the U.S [75].  
IEEE 802.11p is a relatively mature standard in an IoT perspective. The project was 
accepted as part of the IEEE working group in September 2004. Final approval date was 
17
th
 of June 2010 and the standard was added to the part of IEEE 802.11 standard as 
amendment 6. Operation band for 802.11p devices is 5,85–5,925 GHz in United States 
and 5,855–5,905 GHz in Europe. [65] [42] [76] 
Physical layer specification of the 802.11p is identical to the orthogonal frequency-
division multiplexing (OFDM) based old IEEE 802.11a standard, with the addition to 
operation on reduced 10 MHz channels. Vehicular communication scenarios suffer from 
increased delay between arrival of the multipath components of the signal, compared to 
the traditional 802.11a-based WLANs. Halving channel bandwidth from 20 MHz re-
duces the problem, but also halves the supported physical layer data rate to 27 Mb/s. 
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802.11p also allows a lot higher maximum radio output power to fill the need of in-
creased communication distance due to nodes moving at high speeds. Maximum output 
power is increased to 760mW in 802.11p from 40mW in traditional 802.11a indoor an-
tennas. Radios also need to operate on broader temperature range due to harsh outdoor 
conditions, thus 802.11p extends the range from -40 °C to 85 °C. [65] [42] [76] 
The 1609 family of standards consists of 1609.4 (upper MAC layer definition) 
1609.3 (networking), 1609.2 (security), 1609.1 (resource management), 1609.5 (com-
munication management) and 1609.0 (overall architecture). As briefly discussed earlier 
in this work, WAVE frequency bandwidth is divided into multiple channels. This is 
defined in 1609.4. Frequency channels consist of control channel for safety applications 
and service channel for non-safety applications. Coordination of multichannel access in 
vehicular ad hoc networks requires a global synchronization method. 802.11p offers a 
timing synchronization function to facilitate global synchronization based on external 
timing source, like GPS. [65] [42] 
The 1609.2 security standard outlines an authentication and certification methods 
used for PKI in VANET communication. The standard also describes message encryp-
tion and decryption using ECC. The trusted entity for signing certificates is defined as 
Security services in the standard. However, the definition does not extend on how this 
entity is physically integrated to the network topology. One possible candidate would be 
authentication using existing cellular network, but high latencies and blind spots on 
network coverage create vulnerability windows. The problems of attacker taking advan-
tage of these vulnerability windows are not addressed in 1609.2. [77] 
6.2 Authentication and data-centric trust 
Section 5.3 introduced the general problems and limitations involving authentication 
procedure on VANETs. Most of the derived security questions remain unsolved in the 
VANET standardization work. The available research on subject introduces solutions to 
simplify or completely replace the authentication procedure. Following subsections will 
go into more detail on this research. The proposed solutions can be roughly classified as 
proactive and reactive security solutions. 
6.2.1 Public key infrastructure 
The previously introduced PKI can be classified as proactive security solution involving 
digitally signed messages. Under the PKI solution, messages also include certificates 
signed by certificate authority. With governmental authorities acting as CAs, there will 
be several CAs, similarly to current vehicle registration authorities. These CAs will cor-
respond to a given geographical region (e.g., country, state, metropolitan area, etc). In 
case of vehicle manufacturers acting as CAs, different CAs will also have to be cross-
certified so that vehicles from different manufacturers can authenticate each other. This 
requires each vehicle to store the public keys of all the CAs whose certificates may need 
to be verified. As explained in Section 5.3, vehicles authenticate a set of public/private 
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key pairs with CA using ELP or ECN. A single pair of keys has only a lifetime of few 
minutes to prevent vehicle tracking.  In the case of regional CAs, vehicles can request a 
new set of public/private keys as they enter new region, but in the case of vehicle manu-
facturers acting as CAs, the stored public/private key set needs to be considerably lar-
ger. [68] 
One of the challenging problems of using PKI is certificate revocation. System 
needs to able to revoke certificates of recognized maliciously acting vehicles and mal-
functioning devices.  
Commonly used method to revoke certificates is distribution of Certificate Revoca-
tion Lists (CRLs) that consist of the most recently revoked certificates [66]. CRLs are 
distributed when infrastructure is available. Keys also expire automatically due to short 
lifetime of certificates. Both of these methods are described in the IEEE 1609.2 standard 
[77]. There are still a few drawbacks to using these methods. CRLs can be very long 
due to the large number of vehicles and their high mobility. A given vehicle can en-
counter an enormous number of vehicles during its trip through congested region, espe-
cially over longer distances. The short lifetime of certificates also creates a vulnerability 
window. Availability of the CA infrastructure is also a major shortcoming. Infrastruc-
ture can’t be expected to be always available, especially in the first stages of deploy-
ment. [68] 
A set of revocation protocols have been suggested to avoid the mentioned shortcom-
ings [68]. First protocol of the set is Revocation Protocol of the Tamper-Proof Device 
(RPTD). This protocol assumes that each vehicle is equipped with Tamper-Proof De-
vice, which stores all the cryptographic information required for authentication proce-
dure (tamper-proof hardware will be further discussed in Subsection 6.2.2). This proto-
col also assumes that TPD of the vehicle is not compromised and attacker cannot inter-
fere with its operation. Once the CA has made a decision to revoke all the keys of a 
given vehicle M, it sends a revocation message encrypted with vehicle’s public key. 
After the vehicle’s TPD receives the message, it decrypts it, erases all the keys and 
stops signing further safety messages. Vehicle confirms the operation by sending a con-
firmation message to the CA. All the communication between vehicle and the CA takes 
place via base stations, so the CA has to have information about vehicle’s location in 
order to select the base station through which it will send the revocation message. If 
vehicle’s exact location is not known, the most recent known location of the vehicle is 
used and paging area is defined with a set of covering base stations. Revocation mes-
sage is then multicasted through these base stations. In case there is no recent location 
available, or ACK is not received within timeout period, the CA broadcasts the revoca-
tion message, for example, via the low-speed FM radio on a nationwide scale or via 
satellite broadcast. [68] 
The second protocol of the set is Revocation protocol using Compressed Certificate 
Revocation Lists (RCCRL). This protocol is used when only a subset of a vehicle’s keys 
needs to be revocated or when the TPD of the vehicle is unreachable. TDP can become 
unreachable for example, in the case of jamming or by tampering of the device. RCCRL 
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makes use of Bloom filters. Bloom filter is a probabilistic data structure used to test 
whether an element is a member of a set. Given the large size of CRLs in VANETs, this 
can reduce its size to a few kilobytes. These reduced CRLs are broadcasted once in 
every 10 minutes, so this protocol also heavily relies on available infrastructure. 
RCCRL messages are also received by neighbouring cars. [68] 
The last introduced certificate revocation protocol is called Distributed Revocation 
Protocol (DRP). The DRP is used in the pure ad hoc mode in vehicle-to-vehicle com-
munications. Vehicles accumulate accusations against misbehaving vehicles, evaluate 
them using reputation systems, and in case a vehicle is deemed untrusted, CA is notified 
once the connection is available. Unlike the first two protocols, when using DRP, cer-
tificate revocation is triggered by neighbouring vehicles when misbehaviour is detected. 
Detecting malicious information is based on digitally signed messages, that can be lev-
eraged to spot vehicles generating this data via similar methods to position cheating 
detection methods presented in Subsection 4.2.1 [78]. [68] 
6.2.2 Other proactive concepts 
To avoid complexity and infrastructure requirements of the PKI, other proactive solu-
tions have been proposed, including the use of digital signatures without certificates 
[78] [79]. These solutions use the public/private key pair authentication to establish pri-
vate keys for further communication, similarly to the PKI. Keys are also changed peri-
odically, usually between few minutes. Without third party certification, key pairs can 
be freely generated by nodes themselves and node may generate new pairs constantly. 
These solutions offer weak assumption of identification and authenticity. 
However, signing messages extends local distinguishability over time and space and 
adds another way to perform plausibility checks. As long as the node keeps the same 
public key, it can be authenticated as the same node by the other nodes that have previ-
ous records of communication with a given node. This is true regardless of where and 
when the previous communication took place. Consider a node Alice that has had nodes 
Bob and Carol at its local neighbourhood. During that time, Alice was also able to es-
tablish that Bob and Carol are truly distinct nodes (via other plausibility checks). 
Though these nodes may have moved out of Alice’s neighbourhood of distinguishabil-
ity, they now remain distinguishable to Alice as long as they sign their messages with 
the same private keys. [78] 
 We need to also consider strong adversaries who may collude and exchange private 
keys. Similarly to using PKI and DRP based certificate revocation, when a node is 
deemed untrusted, all messages coming from the node are dropped. As node’s public 
key can no longer be trusted, the dropping decision needs to happen based on multiple 
plausibility checks, including also ones based on vehicle’s location. 
Another proactive authentication solution is to use proprietary system design. This 
can be done by using non-public protocols to restrict access from the nodes that are not 
using these protocols. The same can be achieved with the use of customized hardware 
or with the combination of both solutions. Due to massive scale of deployment of future 
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VANETs, it is likely that these solutions will not stop adversaries with considerable 
expertise. These solutions aim at raising the required financial and time effort an at-
tacker has to spend in order to gain access into the system. [69] 
The last proactive solution for authentication is tamper-resistant hardware. Some 
tamper-resistant hardware is already required by the other authentication solutions. We 
introduced the requirement of the Tamper-Proof Device when using PKI. As the name 
implies, the TPD needs to contain a set of sensors that can detect hardware tampering 
and erase all the stored keys to prevent them from being compromised. This feature 
makes designing a TPD for VANET conditions a bit problematic. The device cannot be 
too sensitive to light shocks caused by road imperfections. In some regions, TPD also 
needs to tolerate extreme heat or cold. All this will affect the cost of the device, which 
needs to acceptable for non-business consumers. [66] 
An alternative to a TPD is to use TPM (Trusted Platform Module) that can resist 
software attacks, but not sophisticated hardware tampering. Considering the construc-
tion of modern cars, TPMs can be designed into car’s structure in a way that requires a 
significant effort to gain physical access to them. This makes replacing malfunctioning 
units more difficult, but also raises the effort attacker has to spend in order to achieve 
his or her goals. TPMs are also considerably cheaper to produce than TPDs. [66] 
Whether we choose TPD or TPM and manage to secure the external communication 
part of the application, it is not possible to guarantee that the in-vehicle system is free 
from the generation of unnecessary accident warnings. Attacker can also directly feed 
false information to vehicle’s sensor systems, like proximity sensor or radar, to generate 
distress signals that system accepts as true warnings. There are papers written about 
this, but the methods of guaranteeing the integrity of the whole inter-vehicle system fall 
outside the scope of this thesis [80] [81]. The optimal solution for VANET would be an 
internal vehicle-system security solution that does not require additional communication 
with other nodes. 
6.2.3 Reactive security concepts 
Reactive security concepts are based on correlation of information that is either already 
available into the system from observation on normal system operation or which is in-
troduced additionally. Each vehicle collects information from any information source 
available to its neighbourhood in order to create an independent view of its current 
status and the current surroundings environment. When data is received, it is compared 
to vehicle’s own estimates related to status and environment data, like position to detect 
intrusion. Methods of detecting these types of attacks are similar to anonymous sensor 
solution and plausibility check solution to detect position cheating introduced in Sub-
section 4.2.1. [69] 
Context verification checks can be roughly categorized in three groups. Position in-
formation verification aims to prevent an attacker from pretending to be at arbitrary 
positions. The time verification correlates the vehicle’s internal clock, which is syn-
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chronized and updated using information provided by GPS, with time and data fields of 
the received messages, and in particular of the beacon messages. [69] 
The last verification method is based on application context. Vehicle compares if 
application context correlates with a similar application context known to a vehicle. 
This solution is only possible when there is a set of constraints in a realistic scenario 
where the application can for example, generate and deliver warning messages. [69] 
One application context based security concept introduces a trustworthiness value 
table [82]. In this concept, the trustworthiness of the warning message is calculated 
based on the function of the node (e.g. a police car, a road maintenance vehicle or a pri-
vate vehicle) and the event type (e.g. a junction warning or a revocation list distribu-
tion). Same can be easily applied to our introduced emergency-response vehicle sce-
nario. When a private vehicle receives a junction warning message that is signed by the 
emergency vehicle or an RSU controlling the traffic lights, it can be considered more 
trustworthy than the same message received from a relaying private vehicle. This is 
solely based on an event probability. More application context based solutions relying 
on probability calculations, majority voting and plausibility checks can be found on 
other papers [78] [83].  
Like already mentioned when discussing about proactive security concepts, digital 
signatures do not provide strong guarantee of trustworthiness, unless they are accompa-
nied with the trustworthy PKI. Yet, digital signatures alone can still be useful in signa-
ture-based intrusion detection, where messages with known signatures of attackers are 
dropped. The distinguishability they offer can often be used in conjunction with other 
context verification methods to form a more accurate view of the current surroundings 
environment. 
6.2.4 Discussion 
Security solutions for authentication and providing data-centric trust on VANETs can 
be classified as proactive and reactive. The requirement of the PKI authentication as 
proactive security solution was introduced early in VANET security research [5]. The 
PKI introduces a requirement of CA infrastructure in some form of RSUs and tamper-
proof hardware on the vehicles. 
The reliable method of certificate revocation also proves to be very challenging in 
the PKI based solutions. The three introduced protocols for certificate revocation 
(RPTD, RCCRL and DRP) each present different dependability on available hardware. 
RPTD offers fairly reliable method of certificate revocation message reaching the target 
vehicles, but the size of the vulnerability window depends on coverage of the CA con-
trolled RSUs. The protocol also relies on expectation that malicious vehicle’s TPD is 
not compromised, which is not very realistic. For the protocol to operate correctly, TPD 
needs to contain all the radio communication hardware as well as to be resistant to ex-
ternal interference signals. Additionally, as the CA has no way of knowing if the vehi-
cle’s TPD is compromised or not, the other vehicles still need to be notified via other 
protocols. RCCRL is a simple and reliable method of revocation, but relying on timed 
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broadcasts makes it unviable for delay-sensitive scenarios, like our presented emer-
gency-response vehicle scenario. Such scenarios have to rely on DRP for certificate 
revocation. This protocol relies on similar methods of detecting attackers than verifica-
tion based reactive security concepts. 
When considering PKI based authentication solutions, the advantages and shortcom-
ings of the system needs to be weighted carefully. The PKI presents a significant hard-
ware requirement in a form of external authentication infrastructure. Still, due to latency 
requirements, the very time sensitive applications, like emergency warning scenarios 
have to rely purely on vehicle-to-vehicle ad hoc communication. On these situations, 
certificate revocation of a given vehicle may need to be done at the same time with the 
decision whether to trust the emergency message sent by the same vehicle. 
This problem has lead researchers to a direction of data-centric trust security con-
cepts that do not rely on the PKI [78] [82]. When certificates provided by the CA are 
not used, the digital signatures on messages can no longer provide strong authenticity 
and only offer a local node distinquishability. This distinquishability can still be used in 
conjunction with other plausibility checks to better detect falsified information. In the-
ory, when two privately owned vehicles communicate with each other, digital signatures 
alone can offer a similar trust level to the PKI solution, as threat of previously trusted 
node turning into malicious insider is a serious threat in VANETS, even when the 
trusted node provides keys certified by the CA. 
The clear disadvantage of missing the CA is that trust level on government con-
trolled nodes cannot be guaranteed compared to the PKI based solution. Under the PKI 
solution, the CA’s certificate can provide strong authenticity. If we can trust that certain 
vehicle really is a police car or a certain RSU really is government controlled, we can 
also trust safety messages signed by these nodes. On our emergency-response vehicle 
example scenario, most critical security issues can be solved by using the PKI. 
Proprietary system design is another direction in proactive solutions for authenticity. 
Free mobility of vehicles between regions, countries and even continents requires these 
systems to be interoperable. Over the course of history, public protocols have proven to 
be more secure over private protocols. This is due to extensive amount of evaluation 
and testing the public protocols are subjected to. Considering massive scale of 
VANETs, the likelihood of any protocol remaining private also decreases. Due to these 
reasons, the chances are that proprietary system design solutions can cause more harm 
than good. 
Tamper-resistant hardware is also suggested as proactive security solution, and PKI 
solutions already require some level of tamper-resistance from vehicle’s on board sys-
tems. The initial implementation of VANETs will require the cost of the required hard-
ware to be at acceptable level, which will support the choice of TPM over TPD. The 
exact composition of vehicle’s on-board tamper-resistance systems will have to be 
compromise between cost and acceptable security. 
Most reactive data-centric security concepts are based on plausibility checks. When 
plausibility checks are done locally, they cause very little extra strain on the system, as 
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VANET nodes have a little transmission time available, but plenty of computation and 
battery power. 
Consequently, the use of these plausibility checks in addition to any other chosen 
security solution is advisable. Digital signatures should be used even when PKI solution 
is not used, as they can be used as additional information source for plausibility checks. 
The final data-centric trust solution for VANETs is going to be a compromise of both, 
proactive and reactive security concepts. 
6.3 Geo-addressing and secure localization 
As discussed in Section 5.4, rapid network topology changes in VANETs require a geo-
addressing based routing solution. These routing solutions expose VANETs to special-
ized attacks designed to deliberately retrieve and track the location of vehicles or other-
wise take advantage of sending messages with misguided location information. Secure 
localization solution is needed to protect the system from these kinds of attacks. We 
briefly introduced tamper-proof GPS as one possible solution, but GPS-based solutions 
are pointed to suffer from several vulnerabilities [73]. 
6.3.1 Solutions 
One proposed solution that doesn’t rely on GPS is verifiable multilateration. This solu-
tion is based on roadside infrastructure and distance bounding. Distance bounding guar-
antees that the distance is no greater than certain value. Multilateration is the same op-
eration in several dimensions. The working principle of verifiable multilateration is the 
following: Four base stations with known locations perform distance bounding to the 
vehicle. The results give them four upper bounds on the distance from vehicle. If verify-
ing base stations can uniquely calculate vehicle’s location using three distance bounds 
and this location can be placed in a triangular pyramid between verifiers, then the loca-
tion is deemed correct. Similarly, vehicle’s location can be calculated in two dimensions 
with only two base stations. [73] 
As distance bounding is based on ultrasound, the location verification can produce 
erroneous results giving vehicle a longer distance to the verifier than it really is, but the 
result can never be shorter than the real distance. A location verification protocol that 
uses distance bounding to verify a node’s self-provided location has also been proposed 
[84]. This allows vehicles to use insecure location determination mechanism, like GPS, 
without compromising the security of the system. The solution is based on challenge-
and-response scheme and also involves verifier nodes. Verifiers are placed between 
acceptable distances from each other to form overlapping coverage circles with the ra-
dius of R. Verifier first requests a node to send its position via radio link and after posi-
tion message is received, verifier sends challenge message to the node. Upon receiving 
the challenge message, the node has to reply via ultrasound. If the reply arrives in time, 
the verifier accepts that node is within the region R. [69] 
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Another challenge-and-response based secure localization solution relies on the 
broadcast nature of radio communication and cooperation of sensor nodes [85]. Intui-
tively, once the location provider produces a radio signal, nodes in its vicinity will re-
ceive the signal, while more remote nodes will not. The nodes that received the signal 
can compare their signal receiving times to determine if the location provider’s informa-
tion can be trusted. Nodes outside the assumed zone of the location provider act as re-
jectors. If these nodes receive the location signal, it will be rejected. [85] 
A few research papers introduce a position verification system based on autonomous 
sensors that detect nodes sending falsified location data [86] [87]. Despite their name, 
the described sensors are mostly a set of threshold limits each vehicle monitors from 
received messages. Sensors only use information provided by routing layer and special 
hardware is required. One of these sensors is Acceptance Range Threshold (ART), 
which is a simple method of discarding position beacons from nodes claiming to be at 
distance larger than maximum communications range. Using a combination of autono-
mous sensors, vehicles independently calculate trust ratings of neighbouring nodes. Un-
trusted nodes are excluded from future routing decisions. Vehicles can also act in col-
laboration, exchanging and comparing sensor information with their neighbours. [86] 
There are also suggestions to provide secure localization to certain geo-addressing 
protocols. Secure Grid Location Service (SGSL), an improvement to original GLS-
protocol is designed to prevent position spoofing attack [88]. SGSL uses distance 
bounding, plausibility checks and ellipse-based location estimation to verify node’s 
claimed position. Secure localization is also developed for Position Based Routing 
(PBR) [89]. PBR is considered and evaluated by the Car2Car Communication Consor-
tium (C2C-CC) and found to be scalable and efficient unicast forwarding solution for 
large-scale and highly volatile ad hoc networks. PBR is based on beaconing, multi-hop 
forwarding and geo-location discovery. Location discovery is used when a node needs 
to send a message to another node that is not marked in its location table. The originator 
node sends a location query message with the ID of requested node. Query message also 
includes sequence number and hop limit values. Query message is forwarded by the 
neighbouring nodes, until the searched node is reached. Searched node then replies with 
a message carrying its current position and a time stamp. When originating node re-
ceives the reply message, it marks the new entry to its location table. To secure these 
query and location messages and also other PBR messages, each received messages 
need to pass plausibility checks. Plausibility checks are done by comparing message’s 
timestamp and location information with expected values. If a message passes the plau-
sibility check, then message’s certificate is validated. If certificate is found valid, the 
digital signature of the message is verified. Failing any of these checks causes message 
to get discarded. [69] [89] 
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6.3.2 Discussion 
A few promising secure localization solutions have been proposed to secure geo-
routing and position-critical safety applications in VANETs. Many solutions have also 
been found functional on a concept level. 
Verifiable multilateration solution can be used in many situations by only two stra-
tegically placed base stations. Knowing vehicle’s position in two dimensions can be 
enough when the known road infrastructure is taken into account. Still the system has a 
distinctive disadvantage of huge infrastructure requirement. Verifiable multilateration 
can also be improved by time synchronization. If base stations have synchronized 
clocks, distance bounding can be done with only one base station sending the request 
message each recording the time they received reply from the vehicle. This reduces 
overhead of the system, but still distance bounding needs to be done frequently to keep 
vehicle’s position updated. The system does not scale well compared to solutions that 
rely on vehicle’s self-provided location source. 
Another distance bounding based solution that uses verifier nodes lessens the num-
ber of base stations required, but also limits the location accuracy to a circular region. 
This solution also requires vehicles to be equipped with ultrasound-capable transmitters. 
The main disadvantage of this solution is that while knowing that vehicle is on certain 
region is enough for many geo-routing solutions, most of the safety related applications 
rely on knowing exact location of the vehicle. Collision avoidance applications, like the 
emergency-response vehicle scenario presented in Chapter 5 can have at most few me-
ters of error margin in provided position information. This would require application 
level of more accurate secure localization solution. 
A solution based on radio broadcast monitoring achieves similar location accuracy 
to distance bounding using verifier nodes. The main difference is that no external infra-
structure is needed. The solution also has an advantage of accuracy being related to the 
number of nodes in the area. The problem with this solution is that it is not resilient 
against collaborating attackers. The protocol assumes that messages from verifiers and 
rejectors can be trusted, which is not true in the case of VANETs as malicious insiders 
have very easy access to the network. The protocol also relies in message chains where 
an acceptor waits message from another acceptor, before sending its own reply. This 
makes the solution unreliable due to rapidly changing VANET topology. 
Solutions that involve autonomous position cheating detecting sensors have advan-
tage of requiring no additional hardware and adding no extra security overhead. 
VANET nodes have adequate amount of processing and battery power, but limited time 
for message exchange, which makes this an ideal approach. A sensor that checks 
claimed position information against known road infrastructure and even known other 
vehicle locations can prevent several position spoofing attacks. Having vehicles ex-
changing sensor information with each other exposes network to a new security attacks, 
but the trust rating system offers a better ways to detect malicious insiders than previous 
solutions. 
6. Standards and security solutions in vehicular communications 49 
A few more recent propositions go a step further and integrate some of the previ-
ously introduced secure localization methods to known geo-addressing based protocols, 
based on unicast IP routing extended to deal with GPS addresses. These solutions seem 
most promising as providing secure localization directly on a routing level reduces secu-
rity overhead. However, there is an open problem of position information accuracy. 
Providing very accurate position information is not optimal for routing purposes. It is 
likely that collision related safety applications will require more accurate positioning 
solution. 
6.4 Anonymity, liability and privacy 
Due to unique nature of VANETs, a certain level of anonymity, liability and privacy is 
required. Providing optimal tradeoff between these requirements is a challenging task.  
We introduced ELPs, ECNs and periodically changing public/private key pairs as key 
elements of protecting driver’s anonymity and privacy. However, the introduction of 
changing anonymous pseudonym does not yet fully protect VANET nodes from move-
ment tracking attacks. If lifetime of the public key is several minutes and different vehi-
cles update their public keys are different times, the situations can be observed where 
consecutive messages and key pairs can be linked together and thus the whole move-
ment of a vehicle can be traced [69]. Despite the pseudonym update, an attacker can 
link new and old pseudonyms together using temporal and spatial relocation between 
the new and old locations of the vehicle. A few solutions exist that can reduce the risk 
of attacker being able to link subsequent keys together. These solutions are examined in 
this Chapter. 
6.4.1 Solutions 
One research paper introduces the use of a random silent period when the vehicle enters 
VANET network or changes its public key [90]. When a target vehicle enters the net-
work it broadcasts using pseudonym Alice, and then goes to silence. If a neighbouring 
vehicle updates its pseudonym from Bob to Ben during this silent period, then an at-
tacker could be mislead to consider pseudonym Ben as the new pseudonym for the tar-
get vehicle. 
Another research paper introduces a concept of creating mix-zones at appropriate 
predetermined locations in VANETs to protect driver’s privacy [91]. All vehicles au-
thenticated in the same mix-zone share the same private key. The private key is pro-
vided by an RSU located in the mix-zone. Vehicles use the same public key as long as 
they are within the mix-zone, but switch to a new public key when exiting the mix-zone 
and entering a new one. 
A few papers by the same authors present the concept of adaptive privacy to protect 
driver’s anonymity [92] [93]. The authors argue, that privacy is a user-specific concept, 
and a good privacy protection mechanism should allow users to select the degrees of 
privacy they wish to have. Users may want to use different level of privacy depending 
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on whether they are communicating with a public or a private server. Offered trust poli-
cies are full-trust, partial-trust, and zero-trust. Full-trust policy trusts both types of serv-
ers. Partial-trust policy trusts only public servers and zero-trust policy neither types of 
servers. The higher level of privacy results in more overheads. In computational over-
heads, the overhead includes encrypting, digitally signing and decrypting messages. In 
communication overhead, the overhead includes the transportation of authentication 
messages and encrypted or digitally signed user data. 
The protocol also assumes a similar group based authentication to the introduced 
mix-zone concept that involves vehicles authenticating through RSUs. The key idea in 
the concept is the adaptive protocol that allows users to choose appropriate compromise 
between desired anonymity and computational overhead. 
Another solution focuses on the practicality of the implementation of pseudonyms 
that protect drivers’ anonymity, namely the periodically changing public/private key 
pairs [94]. The solution attempts to bring together different aspects of previously intro-
duced concepts like random silent period and mix-zone and address the concept across 
layers of real VANET protocol stack. The paper provides practical solutions to different 
aspects, like, cross-layer addressing concept to tie together MAC, position-based rout-
ing and IPv6 addresses. The paper also provided extended location service to protect 
vehicles’ identities in a multi-hop forwarding scenario. Pseudonymity-enchanced for-
warding scenarios are introduced to deal with difficulties the periodically changing 
pseudonyms can cause to message forwarding. The paper also mentions the use of IEEE 
802.11’s positive acknowledgments and MAC level retransmissions to inform upper 
layer protocols of unsuccessful data frame delivery. These link layer callbacks can re-
duce the time that expired entries are kept in the forwarding table. 
The issue of providing liability in VANETs is not widely researched. The issue is 
mentioned in several papers, but no specific solutions are provided [68]. Some papers 
provide solution concepts that can potentially support liability, like the previously intro-
duced paper about the practicality of pseudonym implementation [94]. However, all the 
potential solutions introduced rely more or less on a PKI authentication system. The 
PKI offers direct vehicle-to-vehicle or vehicle-to-roadside communication using peri-
odically changing pseudonyms, but still allows tracing vehicle’s true identity by author-
ized party. Vehicle’s true identity is based on ELP or ECN, which can only be linked to 
pseudonym by the information possessed by CA. 
If the PKI is not used and the authentication is done by using periodically changing 
pseudonyms, there is no reliable way to link a certain node to any given pseudonym. 
We can still provide liability if we give up using pseudonyms and authenticate directly 
using ELPs or ECNs, but this solution forfeits vehicle’s anonymity and allows vehicle 
tracking. 
6.4.2 Discussion 
The issue of providing anonymity and privacy on VANETs has been introduced early 
on VANET research, but many research papers offer similar solutions to the issue  [78]. 
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The proposed random silent periods enhance protection against movement tracking at-
tacks, but make the practical implementation of changing pseudonyms increasingly 
problematic. 
When a vehicle switches its pseudonym, other vehicles have to treat it as a new 
member to the network. If legitimate members of the network can connect the new 
pseudonym to the previously used one, so can the possible attacker. This also makes all 
the recorded communication information from the previous pseudonym obsolete. Con-
sequently,  this will affect practicality of some of the promising security concepts intro-
duced with secure localization and data-centric trust [78] [82] [83] [86] [87]. These 
methods use plausibility checks to compare received information from a node with the 
previous information received from the same node and expected normal values of the 
information context. Periodical flushing of recorded information cache makes these 
methods more unreliable and particularly vulnerable right after the pseudonym update. 
Random silent periods will increase this vulnerability window. 
Introduction of mix-zones has positive impact on the vulnerability window, pro-
vided that mix-zones are large enough of geographical regions. Providing adaptive pri-
vacy and the placement of mix-zones itself offers a good control over how large scale 
movement tracking attacks can be performed, within the selected pseudonym updating 
rules. 
However, the clear disadvantage is the requirement of additional roadside hardware. 
Joining a new mix-zone first requires each vehicle to authenticate receive the required 
private key through RSU, so connection to the RSU is necessary for all the new vehicles 
entering the mix-zone. Movement tracking between two nodes authenticated on the 
same mix-zone is possible, but mix-zones should be placed and designed in a way that 
attacker is not able to gain significant advantage from the attack. This will likely result 
in mix-zones requiring even better coverage of roadside nodes is comparison the PKI 
only solution. 
The introduced research paper by E. Fonseca, A. Festag, R. Baldessari et al. on im-
plementation of changing pseudonyms provides a few good methods to make the solu-
tion more practical and also extends the solution to cover multi-hop routing [94]. How-
ever, the paper does not include considerations of periodically changing pseudonyms 
working in conjunction with plausibility checks. This area requires more research. 
In the case of secure localization, authentication and data-centric trust, viable non-
PKI solutions are presented. Additionally, the use of the PKI presents additional prob-
lems in these areas, like the issue of certificate revocation. However, in the case of li-
ability support in VANETs, all the reliable solutions are based on the PKI. The liability 
issue also requires additional research. Considering how important providing liability 
support is for governmental institutions, it can be argued that the current research results 
favor a PKI based solutions as candidates for VANET implementation. 
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7 CONCLUSIONS 
 
This thesis introduced the current state of security research and standardization work on 
two IoT application fields: WSNs and VANETs. Many of the major security challenges 
are similar in both cases, like authentication and secure localization. However, these 
challenges still require completely separate solutions due to major differences in com-
munication, network topology and hardware. 
Out of the two areas, the WSNs can be considered to be more advanced regarding 
the standardization work. ZigBee and WirelessHART standards specify authentication 
and key distribution procedure, leaving some options to the implementation. These 
standards also set limits to which WSN applications they can be used for. There are 
many applications that do not fit to the better specified WSN standards. The key issue is 
that solutions for authentication, key distribution, secure localization, routing and data 
aggregation each highly depend on the exact WSN application purpose. Certain com-
promises also need to be made, as security can come with a price of high overhead in 
aspects like routing. Therefore, prioritizing security against most probable threats in the 
particular application is advisable. The attacks that are hardest to counter usually in-
volve first compromising a legitimate sensor node. Securing the WSN becomes consid-
erably easier if the node capture can be reliably detected, even with only human super-
vision. 
In the case of VANETs, standardization work leaves many security questions com-
pletely open and to be solved in the implementation phase. The big question related not 
only to authentication, but to other major security challenges as well, is the implementa-
tion of the PKI. There is a lot of research available and solutions to solve individual 
security issues without the use of the PKI. However, none of the non-PKI solutions 
solve the simultaneous liability and anonymity requirement present on VANETs. Fur-
thermore, most of the non-PKI security measures rely on plausibility checks and possi-
bly on majority voting, which even though has shown promising results, will not be as 
reliable as trusted third party. 
Implementing PKI using cellular network infrastructure requires a lot of effort and 
international cooperation by the governments. The full potential of many safety applica-
tions also requires that majority of the vehicles on the roads can communicate with 
VANET. The result is a transition phase, where the penetration of VANET communica-
tion capable vehicles increases and more VANET applications become gradually avail-
able. 
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The increasing coverage of the 4
th
 generation (4G) cellular networks also requires 
more research on the VANET context. The new cellular technology allows lower la-
tency times, which could allow even some of the latency-dependent emergency mes-
sages to be transmitted over the cellular network, instead of direct vehicle-to-vehicle 
communication. 4G networks may also offer other advantages, such as more accurate 
positioning methods over multilateration in comparison to previous generation of cellu-
lar networks. 
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